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INTRODUCTION

A.

Overview: Historical and StructuralFlaws
in the FederalArbitration Act

Congress created a policy that favors arbitration by enacting the
U.S. Arbitration Act (USAA), now called the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).' FAA proponents convinced Congress that the law was needed
to end judicial hostility to arbitration. 2 This view was exaggerated,
I United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
2 The Senate Report emphasized that the effect of the bill would be to abolish
the judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements. See S. REP. No. 68-536, at
2-3 (1924). During Senate debate, Senator ThomasJ. Walsh explained: "In short, the
bill provides for the abolition of the rule that agreements for arbitration will not be
specifically enforced." 66 CONG. REc. 984 (1924) (statement of Sen. Walsh). The
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grounded in two English precedents from the 1700s 3 that some Amer-

ican courts followed. 4 English and American courts were not hardened opponents to arbitration. Many rulings preserved the autonomy
5
of arbitration.
When lawmakers passed the FAA in 1925, they never learned that
an English statute of 1697 authorized judicial enforcement of arbitration awards. 6 Congress did not appreciate that as early as the 1600s,
English sentiment favored arbitration because court litigation wasted
time and money.7 Lawmakers overlooked Lord Mansfield's pivotal
use of his court's authority in the 1700s to foster commercial
arbitration. 8
These oversights would be academic but for the fact that Congress patterned the FAA after New York's arbitration law,9 and New
same point was raised during House debate. See 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).
3 See Avery v. Scott (Scott II), (1853) 8 Exch. 497, 155 Eng. Rep. 1447; Kill v.
Hollister, (1746) 1 Wils. K.B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532.
4 See infra Part II.B.1.
5 See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
6 See 1697-98, 9 Will. 3, c. 15 (Eng.). The preamble of the law stated: "[F]or
promoting trade, and rendering the awards of arbitrators the more effectual in all
cases, for the final determination of controversies referred to them by merchants and
traders, or others, concerning matters of account or trade, or other matters." Id.
John Locke's role in formulating the statute is documented in Henry Horwitz &James
Oldham, John Locke, Lord Mansfield, and Arbitration During the Eighteenth Century, 36
HIsT.J. 137, 138-39 (1993).
7 See, e.g.,JOsIAH CHILD, A NEW DISCOURSE OF TRADE 141-44 (London,J. Hodges

et al. 4th ed. 1745). His chapter, "Concerning a Court Merchant," said that "this
Kingdom will at length be blessed with a happy method, for the speedy, easy, and
cheap deciding of differences between Merchants, Masters of Ships, and Seamen by
some Court or Courts of Merchant." Id. at 141. He complained that conventional
litigation in courts of law entailed "tedious attendance and vast expenses" that tended
to result in "empty purses and grey heads." Id. at 142. The preface of Sir Child's
book indicates that he wrote the treatise "long before the last session of Parliment,
which began the 19th of October, 1669." Id. at i. This suggests the possibility that his
ideas influenced enactment of the arbitration statute.
8 See, e.g., C.H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 104-05 (1936) ("The collaboration of
judge and merchant, if it was to exercise its due influence upon the law, required
adequate channels of communication. In the development of the special jury Lord
Mansfield found the vital medium.... Lord Mansfield converted an occasional into a
regular institution, and trained a corps ofjurors as a permanent liaison between law
and commerce.").
9 Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel of the New York State Chamber of Commerce, and a chief architect of the USAA, testified before a congressional committee
on the virtues of the New York arbitration law. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial
Disputes:Joint Hearings on S.1005 and H.R 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comms. on the
Judiciary, 68th Cong. 13-18 (1924) [hereinafter Hearings]. The influential role played
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York based its legislation on English law. 10 Somehow, Congress lost
perspective of the American replication of English law. Amusingly,
FAA sponsors acted as though they pioneered protection of arbitration from intrusive court review.1 1
If the FAA was founded on historically faulty grounds-specifically, if the judicial hostility thesis was flawed eighty years ago-why
does this problem matter today? Ironically, the FAA retarded the
development of common law standards that were deferential to arbitration. Paradoxically, the FAA set into motion current state legisla12
tion that is leading to much greater vacatur of arbitration awards.
For this Article, I collected and analyzed employment arbitrations
that were challenged by a losing party. My database contains 426 federal and state court rulings from 1975-2007 that confirmed or vacated
awards. These courts acquired jurisdiction of arbitrator rulings
because the FAA oddly allows parties to choose a federal or state
forum, including the respective reviewing standards.1 3 Magnifying
this anomaly, the FAA sets forth specific and narrow standards for federal court review of contested awards, 14 but allows states to enact their
own judicial review standards. 15 For many years, state arbitration laws
mirrored the FAA. In a key finding, however, my research shows that
this parallelism is breaking down.
by the New York law is validated in Rosenthal v. Great Western FinancialSecurities Corp.,

926 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Cal. 1996) ("In most important respects, the California statutory
scheme on enforcement of private arbitration agreements is similar to the USAA; the
similarity is not surprising, as the two share origins in the earlier statutes of New York
and New Jersey."). For a contemporaneous summary of the origins of the New York
law, see Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 289 (N.Y. 1921) (describing
the policy of section 2 of the law, which abolished the ancient rule against enforcement of arbitration agreements).
10 See William C. Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile
Disputes in Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 460 n.79 (1958)
(citing Act of Dec. 31, 1768, reprinted in 4 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 1040
(Albany, N.Y., James B. Lyon 1896)).
11

See infra notes 49-52.

12 An award is the arbitrator's ruling or disposition of an issue. It functions like a
court judgment.
13 See9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000); see also Bull HN Info. Sys. Inc. v. Hutson, No. CIV. A.
98-10-998-RCL, 1998 WL 426047, at *1 (D. Mass. July 24, 1998) ("[T]he FAA [Federal
Arbitration Act] 'is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction'
because it 'creates a body of federal substantive law' without simultaneously
'creat[ing] any independent federal-question jurisdiction .... ' (second alteration in
original) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
25 n.32 (1983))), rev'd, 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000).
14 See9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
15 See infra note 141 (providing examples of states that have adopted UAA vacatur
standards).
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This is because states are enacting more intrusive reviewing standards. 16 My data suggest that the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
(RUAA) ,'7 a model law that expert commissioners drafted in 2000,
plays a role in this development. The RUAA was largely motivated by
disturbing trends in the 1990s that raised questions about the fairness
of arbitration. The growing use of mandatory arbitration fueled this
concern. I8 In the workplace, employers implemented arbitration procedures to enhance their advantage over individuals. They shifted
large forum costs to employees,' 9 designated inconvenient venues, 20
placed arbitrary remedial limits on arbitrator powers, 2' shortened
time bars to file claims, 22 and selected arbitrators without employee
input. 23 RUAA Commissioners stated in their prefatory note that
their "new provisions are intended to reflect developments in arbitra24
tion law and to insure that the process is a fair one."
16

See, e.g., infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.

17 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 1 (2005); see also infra notes
142-43 and accompanying text (discussing the states that have adopted the RUAA).
18 In mandatory arbitration, one party conditions a contractual benefit or entitlement-for example, employment or use of a credit card-on the other party's agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration instead of a court. Because the arbitration
clause is a nonnegotiable condition of the contractual relationship, it is called
mandatory.
19 See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003)
("Minimal research will reveal that the potential costs of arbitrating the dispute easily
reach thousands, if not tens of thousands, of dollars, far exceeding the costs that a
plaintiff would incur in court.").
20 See, e.g.,
Poole v. L.S. Holding, Inc., No. 2001-57, 2001 WL 1223748, at *1
(D.V.I. Aug. 20, 2001) (rejecting the contention of a Virgin Islands employee that
Massachusetts is a prohibitively expensive venue to arbitrate a claim).
21 See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 827 (S.D.
Ohio 1999) (finding that although Title VII permits up to $300,000 in punitive damages and compensatory damages, a $162,000 limit imposed on punitive damages by
an arbitration agreement was valid), affd, 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003).
22 See, e.g., Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that because ERISA provides a four-year statute of limitations for an action
to recover benefits under a written contract, the plan administrator breached its fiduciary duty by adopting a mandatory arbitration clause that set a sixty-day time limit in
which to demand arbitration); Louis v. Geneva Enter., 128 F. Supp. 2d 912, 917 n.2
(E.D. Va. 2000) (determining that the sixty-day filing limit in an arbitration agreement drafted by the employer unlawfully conflicted with the three-year statute of limitations for Fair Labor Standards Act claims).
23 See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the only possible purpose of the employer's arbitration rules was "to undermine
the neutrality of the proceeding" when an employee was allowed to select one arbitrator from a list created exclusively by Hooters).

24

UNIF. ARBITRATION

ACT prefatory note (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 3 (2005).
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My research does not assess whether post-RUAA arbitrations are
more fair, but my statistical analysis shows a pernicious trend for arbitral finality-a finding that would surprise and chagrin the FAA Congress. Recall that lawmakers wanted minimal court interference with
arbitration. My data from federal courts would reassure them. Districtjudges confirmed 92.7% of these arbitrator decisions. 25 But state
trial judges confirmed only 78.8% of awards. 26 This difference is statistically significant. The analysis for appellate courts produced a similar result-an 87.7% confirmation rate at the federal level, but only a
27
71.4% level for state courts.
These results raise serious concerns because (a) there is now a
measurable degree of judicial hostility to arbitration in state courts,
(b) federal and state courts do not provide uniform or even similar
results, (c) the FAA may be contributing to forum shopping for the
enforcement of arbitration awards, and (d) the increased level ofjudicial reversal of arbitration awards portends more time-consuming and
expensive litigation-and relitigation-of disputes, notwithstanding
an underlying agreement by parties to resolve disputes with a final
and binding award.
I conclude that these worrisome trends and possibilities are structurally rooted in the history and text of the FAA. Left alone, courts
can be more trusted than state legislatures to preserve the finality of
the arbitration process. But courts are increasingly subservient to
state arbitration statutes that elevate arbitral fairness over finality. In
the short term, higher rates of vacatur may mollify critics and skeptics
who call attention to particularly unfair arbitration practices. 28 But I
25 See infra Part V.A.
26 See infra Part V.A.
27 See infra Part V.A.
28 The stream of critical publications is extensive. Current and representative
examples include Richard A. Bales, Normative Considerationsof Employment Arbitration at
Gilmer's Quinceafiera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 390-93 (2006) (stating that mandatory
arbitration will not be a fair process until a clear set of due process rules is implemented and a penalty is imposed on employers who draft flagrantly one-sided arbitration agreements); Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH.
L. REv. 1029, 1078-79 (2004) (noting that by enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements, courts avoid dealing with a considerable volume of employment litigation);
Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and DiscoveringHow the Public Dimensions of CourtBased Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 521, 524-25 (2006) (arguing that the
privacy that surrounds many arbitrations makes the process less observable and transparent, which in turn raises fundamental questions about accountability in the adjudication of public law claims); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional
Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1721-22 (2006) (stating that by steering class action disputes to a private setting, some arbitration agree-
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suggest that the trend line for vacatur implies serious costs for disputing parties. More arbitration proceedings are becoming lengthy and
costly preludes to final disposition by courts. This implies that long
queues at American courts will grow as parties lose confidence in arbitral finality.
B.

Organization of This Article

Part L.A shows that the Supreme Court and Congress believe that
the FAA ended judicial hostility to arbitration. I trace the source of
this faulty idea to an influential commercial lawyer who spearheaded
lobbying for the FAA. Part I.B reports on congressional intent in the
FAA. I also demonstrate how FAA sponsors overlooked case law that
contradicted their sweeping condemnation of common law courts.
Part II examines common law treatment of arbitration before
1925, when the FAA was passed. Courts were divided in their support
for arbitration. Part II.A explains why it is important to correct this
historical record. The FAA substituted legislative for judge-made standards, so that now this private ADR process is susceptible to more
political pressure compared to a purely judicial supervision. Part
II.B.1 shows that some common law courts opposed or interfered with
arbitration, and Part II.B.2 presents case law that shows strong judicial
support for arbitration. Part II.B.3 demonstrates that the Supreme
Court added to this body of common law in the 1800s by taking a
mixed approach to the autonomy of arbitration.
Part III.A reports on the narrow statutory standards that federal
courts use today in reviewing contested arbitration awards. Part III.A
also explains that the FAA creates parallel jurisdiction for states to
review these awards under standards that their legislatures enact. Part
III.B reveals that a shift is occurring in the award review process, as
more states adopt the RUAA. The RUAA expands grounds for judicial review of awards. The law was proposed to improve fairness in
arbitration, but I also suggest in Part III.B that the RUAA creates
ments do not guarantee procedural protections for absent class members). For
opposing and laudatory views of contemporary arbitration, see William B. Gould IV,
Kissing Cousins?: The FederalArbitration Act and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J.

609, 616 (2006) (expressing a more optimistic view that employer-promulgated arbitration is providing fairness, for example, by utilizing arbitration services that adopted
the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes in
1995); Stephen J. Ware, The Casefor EnforcingAdhesive ArbitrationAgreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. Am. ARB. 251, 254-64

(2006) (stating that enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits society
by reducing process costs, thereby benefiting consumers, employees, and other adhering parties).
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potential to undermine the vital principle that awards are to be final
and binding.
I put this theory to an empirical test. Part IV.A reports my
research methods to create a sample of 426 federal and state court
decisions that ruled on an employment arbitration award. Part IV.B is
a framework for comparing my data to recent studies of court rulings
that reversed a lower court or adjudicatory agency. Table 1 presents
this research in a hierarchy that ranges from "extreme deference" to
"no deference."
Part V.A reports my statistical results. Table 2 shows that federal
district courts confirm about 92% of awards, compared to 78% for
first-level state courts. Table 3 shows similar data for appellate courts.
Federal courts confirm 87% of awards, compared to 71% for state
courts. The results in both tables show that the wide difference in
confirmation rates is unlikely due to chance. Next, I translate these
results into three findings that compare the results to other empirical
studies of court reversal rates.
Part V.B elaborates on qualitative differences between federal
courts that review awards under section 10 standards in the FAA, and
state courts that review awards under RUAA standards. Four issues
appear to be causing federal and state courts to take different
approaches in reviewing awards: (a) arbitrator disclosures to the parties, (b) the award of attorney's fees, (c) the award of punitive damages, and (d) the legality of the underlying agreement to arbitrate.
The Article concludes with the implications of my historical and
29
statistical research.
I.

THE FAA's

FLAWED LEGIsiATIVE HISTORY:

THE JUDICIAL HOSTILITY MYrH

A.

Overview

In a key 1991 decision, Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,3 0 the
Supreme Court explained that the FAA's "purpose was to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts. '3 1 Certainly, Congress embraced this purpose when
29 The state and federal cases that constitute my sample are contained in an
Appendix on file with the author.
30 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
31 Id. at 24. The decision enforced a mandatory arbitration agreement over the
objections of an employee who filed an age discrimination lawsuit against his
employer. The Gilmer majority rejected the employee's contention that the arbitra-
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it said that American courts, influenced by English common law, had
grown hostile to arbitration. 32 But Congress did not do its own homework on this point, and adopted an erroneous view.
This mistake traces to an overzealous proponent of the FAA, a
prominent commercial lawyer named Julius Henry Cohen, who published his views in a 1921 edition of the Yale Law Journal.3 3 His categorical condemnation of American courts should have given pause for
its lack of professional objectivity: "For over three hundred years a
dictum of Lord Coke has held sway over the minds of America. It is
now on its fair way to a decent burial. '34 Cohen meant that American
judges "had been inadvertently led into following an obsolete theory
of the law" 35 that blocked arbitration agreements.

If Cohen and the Congress had investigated more carefully, they
would have tempered their harsh judgment of courts. In a published
case, Brush v. Fisher,3 6 a Michigan court relied on an established line
of precedent from the 1800s that upheld arbitration procedures.
Brush explained that courts have narrow grounds for intruding upon
arbitration when it said that "'there is power in a court of equity to
relieve against awards in some cases where there has been fraud and
misconduct in the arbitrators, or they have acted under some manifest
tion agreement could not be enforced because he did not voluntarily consent to waive
access to courts. Id. at 29. Gilmer led to the widespread adoption of individual

employment arbitration. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment
Doctrine:Imposed Terms, Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS.
L.J. 84, 92-93 (2007).
32 See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924). This passage is quoted in its entirety
because it is the most thorough account of the judicial hostility thesis that Congress
embraced when it passed the FAA.
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law.
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their
own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate
upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction.
This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to
be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently
criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which

results from it. This bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration
shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their
enforcement.
Id.
33 SeeJulius Henry Cohen, The Law of CommercialArbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147 (1921).
34 Id. at 147.
35

Id.

36

38 N.W. 446 (Mich. 1888).
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mistake."' 37 Stating the majority rule, Brush emphasized that "it is evident that there are great objections to any general interference by
38
courts with awards."
Brush was decided near the end of the century, in 1888. An Ala39
bama decision from earlier in the 1800s, Tankersley v. Richardson,
came to the same conclusion: "This Court must, in accordance with a
rule repeatedly laid down . . . intend in favor of the award .... ",40
Campbell v. Western,4 1 a New York case from 1832, similarly endorsed
arbitration: "Awards are much favored, and the court will intend everything in their favor." 4 2 Read together, Brush, Tankersley, and Campbell mean that Cohen and other FAA supporters misjudged the role of
American courts in arbitration disputes.
In the following research, I show that much evidence existed
when the FAA was enacted to question the view that courts were hostile to arbitration. I also show that the FAA was almost entirely fashioned by corporate lawyers and businessmen. These FAA sponsors
had legitimate concerns about improving enforcement of their arbitration agreements. They also had expressed concerns about costs
and inefficiencies that they experienced in civil courts. However,
their legal scholarship was flawed. They found it expedient to
advance the judicial hostility thesis by stigmatizing a group who had
no voice in this legislative proceeding-English and American common law courts.
B.

CongressionalIntent to End Judicial Hostility to Arbitration

In 1925, Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act 43and renamed it the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947 4 4-to help busi45
nesses reduce expense and delay in resolving their legal disputes.
Proposed by the American Bar Association and corporate lawyers, the
37 Id. at 447 (emphasis added) (quoting Port Huron & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Callanan,
34 N.W. 678, 679 (Mich. 1887)).
38

Id. at 448.

39

2 Stew. 130 (Ala. 1829).

40

Id. at 132.

41

3 Paige Ch. 124 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).

42
43

Id. at 138 n.1.
Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp

V 2005)).
44 See Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 14, 61 Stat. 669, 674.
45 See S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (stating that the USAA was proposed to help
businesses avoid "the delay and expenses of litigation"); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2
(1924) (showing that Congress believed the simplicity of arbitration would "reducte]
technicality, delay, and [keep] expense to a minimum and at the same time safeguard[ ] the rights of the parties").
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law used arbitration statutes in New York and New Jersey as models. 4 6
Congress wanted to make arbitration agreements enforceable in
courts of law. 47 Lawmakers proposed a national arbitration model
48
based on federal jurisdiction.
Business leaders promoted the law by contending that lawsuits
led to "ruinous litigation. '4 9 Court battles adversely affected consumers because the costs of litigation were hidden in prices. 50 These costs
were avoided when businesses voluntarily submitted their differences
to arbitration. 5 1 Arbitration offered "the best means yet devised for an
'52
efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive adjustment of ... disputes.
An attorney suggested to Congress that state arbitration law had
already discouraged contract-breaking behaviors, while creating "a
spirit of conciliation and settlement. '53 But federal legislation was
46 See Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Cal. 1996).
47 See id. at 1067. The bill was reintroduced in the 68th Congress with this heading: "Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce
Among the States or Territories or with Foreign Nations." Hearings, supra note 9.
48 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 6-9 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Comm. on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York). The
House Report stated: "The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within
the jurisdiction o[f] admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal
courts." H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1.
49 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Comm. on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York). Bernheimer stated:
I have made a study of the question of arbitration ever since the panic of
1907. The difficulties merchants then met with, that of having repudiations
and other business troubles, resulting in much loss and expense outside of
the costly and ruinous litigation, caused me to start on a study of the subject
of arbitration, and the deeper I got into it the more I was convinced we
should have legislation in State and Nation that would make arbitration a
reality, that would cause an agreement or contract in writing providing for
arbitration to be binding upon the parties and an irrevocable proposition.
Id.
50 Id. at 7 ("The litigant's expenses-that is, whatever is necessary to cover the
annual outlay for litigation or the fear of litigation, consultations with lawyers, the
possibility of cancellations, and so forth, eventually creeps into the selling price as
well.").
51 Id. at 31 (statement of Wilson J. Vance, Secretary, NewJersey State Chamber of
Commerce) (" [T] here are very few cases that have actually come to trial in the arbitration tribunals, [because] business men have adopted the practice of getting
together and settling their business differences.").
52 Id. (statement of Thomas B. Paton, American Bankers Association).
53 Id. at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman, Comm. on Commerce, Trade,
and Commercial Law, American Bar Association).
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needed to improve arbitration. A party who agreed to arbitrate a dispute was free to revoke its submission at any time and not face a legal
consequence.54 Too often, according to FAA sponsors, courts compounded this withdrawal behavior by permitting a party to revoke a
55
submission to arbitration.
To this day, the Supreme Court has taken Cohen's thesis as an
article of faith. 56 But the research he presented to Congress had no
data or case law analysis. After describing judicial hostility to arbitration as "an unfortunate situation in the law," 5 7 Cohen offered a ram58
bling and occasionally folksy justification for his position.
Had Cohen checked sources available at that time, he would have
found contrary evidence. An 1897 HarvardLaw Review article by Addison C. Burnham demonstrated that common law courts were divided
in their approach to enforcing arbitration agreements.5 9 With more
digging, Cohen and Congress would have read an oft-cited English
precedent from 1757, Hawkins v. Colclough,60 and its clear declaration:
54 Id. at 14 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New York State
Chamber of Commerce) ("The difficulty is that men do enter into these [arbitration]
agreements and then afterwards repudiate the agreement .... You go in and watch
the expression on the face of your arbitrator and you have a 'hunch' that he is against
you, and you withdraw and say, 'I do not believe in arbitration any more."').
55

Id. ("[T] he difficulty has been that for over 300 years, for reasons that would

take me too long to undertake to explain at this time, the courts have said that that
kind of an agreement was one that was revocable at any time.").
56 The Court repeats its mantra that the FAA was enacted "'to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts."' EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 24 (1991)); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20, 220
n.6 (1985) (stating that when Congress passed the FAA, it was "motivated, first and
foremost, by a congressional desire" to reverse longstandingjudicial resistance to arbitration); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (providing examples of statements suggesting that courts'
hostility to arbitration agreements originated in contests for jurisdiction). The Court
made the same point in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974)
("English courts traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts ofjurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason.
This view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law up to the time
of the adoption of the Arbitration Act.").
57 Hearings, supra note 9, at 14 (statement ofJulius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce).
58 See id.
59 See Addison C. Burnham, Arbitration as a Condition Precedent, 11 HARv. L. REV.
234 (1897) (showing courts' differences of opinion and arguing that a single
approach is needed).
60 (1757) 1 Burr. 274, 97 Eng. Rep. 311 (KB.).
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"[A]wards ought to be construed liberally and favourably." 6' Lord
Mansfield left an indelible impression when he plainly "declared
against critical niceties, in scanning awards made by Judges of the parties' own choosing"62-a point that was noticed 120 years later by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court in Truesdale v. Straw.63 This court
64
If
thought that Lord Mansfield's rule was a settled point of law.

Cohen and Congress had investigated, they would have found exam65
ples of extreme judicial deference to arbitration.
Truth lost to political expedience, however, when lawmakers concluded that "[t] he need for the law arises from an anachronism of our
American law." 66 The House Report explained:

Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts
for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby
ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a

period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English
67
common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.
The Report erroneously concluded:
The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and
the injustice which results from it. This bill declares simply that
such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a
68
procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.

61
62

Id. at 278, 97 Eng. Rep. at 312.
Id. at 277, 97 Eng. Rep. at 312; see also Hearings, supra note 9, at 14 (statement

of Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce).
63 58 N.H. 207 (1877).
64 Id. at 216 ("The books are full of the rule, and its application to particular
cases, that voluntary arbitration is held by the common law in high estimation, and
that the regularity of the proceedings and the validity of the award are to be

presumed.").
65 See Lord Jeffrey's stunning statement in Mitchell v. Cable that an arbitrator

"may believe what nobody else believes, and he may disbelieve what all the world
believes. He may overlook or flagrantly misapply the most ordinary principles of law,
and there is no appeal for those who have chosen to submit themselves to his despotic
power." E.J. Cohn, Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law: A Comparative Study, 4
U. ToRoNTo L.J. 1, 5 (1941) (quoting (1848) Mitchell v. Cable, 10 D. 1297).
66 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
67 Id. at 1-2.
68 Id. at 2.
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CORRECTING THE RECORD: THE COMMON LAW
REGULATION OF ARBITRATION

A.

Overview

I now consider the common law treatment of arbitration in the
century leading up to the FAA. Before proceeding, we should understand the significance of this historical research. Cohen's overstated
thesis had the effect of substituting statutory standards forjudge-made
regulation of arbitration. Even now, this shift in institutional control
is not fully appreciated. I show that recent arbitration laws enacted by
states-under the dual jurisdiction provisions of the FAA-threaten
the independence of arbitration from court oversight. These recent
laws are designed to make arbitration fairer to parties with weaker bargaining power who are forced into arbitration agreements. Courts are
becoming the referees in post-arbitration disputes over these fairness
issues. But the cost of this new arrangement is that binding awards
are much less final.
The unbinding of arbitration is rooted in the judicial hostility
thesis. By the time that Congress preempted common law regulation
of arbitration, American courts had spent more than a century protecting the bargain to arbitrate. By correcting this historical record, I
suggest that courts are preferable to legislatures for regulating
arbitration.
B. Judicial Regulation of Arbitration Before the FAA
When arbitration supporters came to Congress for relief, they
focused on judicial obstruction in the pre-award phases of arbitration. 69 The underlying problem was that a party to an arbitration
agreement could renege on the bargain. Some refused to submit a
cause to arbitration, preferring to file a lawsuit. Others were unwilling
to select an arbitrator, failed to appear at a hearing, or revoked the
arbitrator's authority to rule before a hearing ended. FAA sponsors
expressed little concern about another important time when courts
regulate arbitration-when an award is rendered, and a party refuses
to accept it.
Again, history tells an informative story that the FAA Congress
overlooked. A party who refused to pay on an arbitration award was
imprisoned for his noncompliance. The Worcester Journal reported a
tense exchange between the prisoner and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in the Court of the King's Bench on November 9, 1770:
69

See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 14-15.
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"A prisoner in the King's Bench came into the court.., and begged

his Lordship to read the copy of his commitment, explain it to him,
and point out what Authority the court had to deprive him of his
liberty: his copy of causes being read, it appeared to be an attachment against the body, for the nonperformance of an arbitration
bond, which the court calls a supposed contempt of court. The prisoner observed, if he had been guilty of any contempt, he looked on
himself bound by the Laws of this free country, to pay implicit obedience; but if a thing imaginary, he hoped it was not sufficient to
deprive a Briton of his Liberty... on which the court said, You have
70
been ordered to pay a sum of money, and you must do it."
The story reinforces the impression that courts were highly deferential in their enforcement of arbitration-to the point of using contempt powers to imprison people who did not comply with awards. In
the following research, I correct the record on the American common
law of arbitration in the 1800s.
The FAA is partly correct in concluding that courts interfered
with the autonomy of arbitration. I consider it an open question
whether or not a majority of courts were guided by the following principles of interference in arbitrations. I show, however, that courts
were divided over arbitration. For now, the record must show that
some judges refused to enforce arbitration agreements, based on the
following doctrines.
1.

Common Law Opposition to Arbitration
a.

Arbitration Agreements Are Revocable

Some judges applied the revocation doctrine 71 to preserve a disputant's access to courts. This allowed a party to withdraw from arbi70 John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763-64: A Study of Radical Notions of

Governance, in AN

UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE

128, 168-69 (John Brewer & John Styles

eds., 1980) (quoting WORCESTER J., Nov. 15, 1770).
71 This doctrine is traced to an English decision reported by Sir Edward Coke in
1609. See Vynior's Case, (1609) 8 Co. Rep. 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B.). William
Wilde and Robert Vynior had a disagreement over a bond, and both men agreed at
the time of making the bond that William Rugge would serve as an arbitrator to
resolve any dispute that should arise. Id. at 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 597. Vynior alleged
that Wilde breached terms of the bond, and received a favorable award from Rugge,
but Wilde contended that he revoked Rugge's authority before the award was made.
Id. Lord Coke's decision allowed Wilde's revocation of the submission to arbitration.
Id. at 82a-83b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 600-01. He agreed that, although William Wilde was
"bound in a bond to stand to, abide, [and] observe" the rule of arbitration, the judge
might countermand the bond "for a man cannot by his act make such authority,
power, or warrant not countermandable, which is by the law and of its own nature
countermandable." Id. at 82a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 598-99. This opened the door to Lord
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tration and sue in court. In the most common case, a person who
agreed to arbitration could revoke his delegation of power to an arbitrator. 72 Some courts allowed revocation until an award was
3
rendered.

7

Coke's court to rule on the debt, and he upheld Vynior's claim. Id. at 83a, 77 Eng.
Rep. at 601. This conclusion is confirmed in Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The
Revocability of ContractProvisions ControllingResolution of Future DisputesBetween the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 207, 209, and Paul L. Sayre,
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 598 (1927).
Julius Cohen highlighted the importance of this decision, claiming that this
faulty ruling swayed American courts for 300 years. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 147.
My research demonstrates that Cohen's claim is seriously overstated. However, it is
also true that numerous nineteenth-century courts knew of Vynior's Case, and considered it at some length. In the interest of historical accuracy, these courts are
reported. See Curtiss v. Beardsley, 15 Conn. 518, 525 (1843); Shroyer v. Bash, 57 Ind.
349, 353 (1877); Mills v. Conner, 1 Blackf. 7, 9 (Ind.1818); Brown v. Leavitt, 26 Me.
251, 256 (1846); Cumberland v. N. Yarmouth, 4 Me. 459, 461 (1827); Damon v.
Granby, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 345, 351 (1824); Rochester v. Whitehouse, 15 N.H. 468,
472 (1844); Haight v. Morris, 7 N.J.L. 289, 298 (1824); Union Ins. Co. of Phila. v.
Cent. Trust Co. of N.Y., 52 N.E. 671, 674 (N.Y. 1899); People ex rel. Union Ins. Co. v.
Nash, 18 N.E. 630, 630 (N.Y. 1888); Clayton v. Liverman, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 558,
561 (17837), overruled in part by In re Davis' Will, 26 S.E. 636 (N.C. 1897); Carey v.
Comm'rs of Montgomery County, 19 Ohio 245, 247 (1850); Zehner v. Lehigh Coal &
Navigation Co., 41 A. 464, 466 (Pa. 1898); Paist v. Caldwell, 75 Pa. 161, 165 (1874);
Bingham's Trs. v. Guthrie, 19 Pa. 418, 423 (1852); Power v. Power, 7 Watts 205, 213
(Pa. 1838); Town of Craftsbury v. Hill, 28 Vt. 763, 764 (1856).
72 See Or. & W. Mortgage Sav. Bank v. Am. Mortgage Co., 35 F. 22, 23 (C.C.D. Or.
1888); Peters' Adm'r v. Craig, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 307, 308 (1838); Jones v. Harris, 59
Miss. 214, 215-16 (1881) (noting that the "right of either party to revoke a submission
before award made, where the submission is not a rule of court, or regulated by statute changing the common law, is well settled and universally recognized"), overruled by
IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 103-04 (Miss. 1998);
Smith v. Compton, 20 Barb. 262, 267 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855).
73 See, e.g., Aspinwall v. Towsey, 2 Tyl. 328, 343 (Vt. 1803) (stating that "either
party may revoke such submission before the award be made and published, and by
such revocation he annuls all contracts relative to the submission conditioned in the
bond"); see also Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns. 205, 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (reasoning
that "[t] here can be no doubt that the defendant could revoke the powers conferred
by the arbitration bond").
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An Arbitration Agreement Is Against Public Policy

Judges ruled that public policy prohibits arbitration agreements
from blocking access to courts.74 Otherwise, private tribunals could
75
not be held accountable under the law.
c.

An Arbitration Agreement Is a Covenant to Refer a Dispute
to Private Adjudication, but Remains Collateral to the Main
Contract and Therefore May Be Disregarded

A party would need to sue for damages resulting from breach of
the contract. 76 Like the condition precedent doctrine, 77 this principle 78 said that an arbitrator could not decide a general question of
79
liability, but only the amount of damages.

74 The main reason that arbitration agreements were voided on public policy
grounds was that the law disfavored ousting courts of their jurisdiction. See Hurst v.
Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) ("Such stipulations [for arbitration] are regarded
as against the policy of the common law, as having a tendency to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts ....
");see also Prince Steam-Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39 F. 704, 704
(S.D.N.Y. 1889) ("Such agreements have repeatedly been held to be against public
policy and void."). The Supreme Court repeated this idea in Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("[Algreements in advance to oust the courts of the
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.").
75 The best explanation for the policy is in Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496
(1858). The court observed that courts of equity would not entertain a suit to compel
parties specifically to perform an agreement to submit to arbitration: "To do so,
would bring such courts in conflict with that policy of the common law which permits
parties in all cases to revoke a submission to arbitration already made." Id. at 496.
The court explained:
This policy is founded in the obvious importance of securing fairness and
impartiality in every judicial tribunal. Arbitrators being selected, not by law,
but by the parties themselves, there is danger of some secret interest,
prejudice or bias in favor of the party making the selection; and hence the
opposite party is allowed, to the latest moment, to make inquiries on the
subject.
Id.
76 See Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co., 99 F. 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1900), affd,
102 F. 926 (2d Cir. 1900).
77 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
78 See Crossley v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 27 F. 30, 31 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886).
79 Munson, 99 F. at 792.
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An Arbitration Agreement Could Not, as a Matter of Law,
Completely Oust Courts of Their Jurisdiction

Some judges believed that no party had lawful authority to diminish the statutory powers of a court.8 0 This view-called the ouster doctrine because it states that courts cannot be ousted from their
jurisdiction by a private contract-is attributed to two English cases,
82
Avery v. Scott (Scott 11)81 and Kill v. Hollister.
Perhaps the Supreme
Court has accepted Congress' judicial hostility thesis because the
Court reached a similar conclusion in an 1874 decision, Insurance Co.
v. Morse.8 3 As early as 1897, however, a noted authority questioned
whether American courts properly understood these two English
courts. Burnham's HarvardLaw Review article-which Congress over84
looked-shows that there were multiple decisions in Scott v. Avery,
80 Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (declaring that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and
void.").
81 (1853) 8 Exch. 497, 155 Eng. Rep. 1447.
82 (1746) 1 Wils. R-B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532.
83 Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 451 (attributing the ouster doctrine to Hollister).
Morse ruled that an individual cannot be compelled to waive his right to a judicial
forum. In a passage that implicated pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the Court
said that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by
law are illegal and void." Id. at 451. In the following dictum, the Court took a dim
view of pre-dispute arbitration agreements that waive access to courts:
In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an
arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise
his right to remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in
each recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may no doubt waive the
rights to which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in
advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit
his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be
presented.
Id.
84 See Burnham, supra note 59, at 234-37 (quoting at length from the Scott II
decision of 1853, 8 Exch. 497, 155 Eng. Rep. 1447, and the Scott v. Avery (Scott III)
decision of 1856, 5 H.L.C. 811, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121). The Scott 1I decision stated the
ouster doctrine. In that decision, Lord Coleridge wrote that "it is conceded that any
agreement which is to prevent the suffering party from coming into a Court of law, or,
in other words, which ousts the Courts of their jurisdiction, cannot be supported."
Scott II, 8 Exch. at 500, 155 Eng. Rep. at 1448. A thorough and scholarly account of
the appellate decision in Scott II appears in Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250 (1872). Summarizing this pro-arbitration ruling, the
New York court said: "The judge lays no stress upon the form of the contract, but
regards the provision for determining the amount to be paid by arbitration as in legal
effect postponing the right of action until after the award is made." Id. at 268 (emphasis
added).
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which together rejected the reasoning of the oft-reported Scott II case. 8 5
The Supreme Court and Congress failed to understand that Lord
Campbell ultimately opposed the ouster doctrine. 86 This correction
by the English court in 1856 was virtually unnoticed. The prior Scott I
decision is mainly responsible for the flawed thesis that underpins the
FAA.
e.

An Arbitration Agreement Is Valid for the Limited Purpose
of Serving as a Condition Precedent to Suit

This doctrine is similar to the current idea of exhausting administrative procedures before suing. According to the condition precedent doctrine, an arbitration agreement could not prevent
subsequent legal action or determine the general question of liability,
87
but could decide limited or collateral issues, such as damages.
85 The author credits the law review's editors for this important discovery. The
two initial Scott v. Avery decisions are found in Scott v. Avery (Scott 1), (1853) 8 Exch.
487, 155 Eng. Rep. 1442, and Avery v. Scott (Scott I1), (1853) 8 Exch. 497, 155 Eng.
Rep. 1447. After the Exchequer ruled for the plaintiff in Scott I, that ruling was overturned on a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber. This ruling for the defendant,
which is in Scott II, contains Coleridge's statement of the ouster doctrine. Id. at 500,
155 Eng. Rep. at 1448. The case was appealed to the House of Lords, where in Scott v.
Avery (Scott II1), (1856) 5 H.L.C. 811, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, the House of Lords affirmed
Scott II, but on different grounds. Ultimately, the House of Lords did not support
Lord Coleridge's view of the ouster doctrine. However, they did not explicitly reject
the doctrine. Id. at 851-56, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1137-39. Burnham came to a similar
conclusion in 1897:
In the Exchequer, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. On writ of
error, the judgment was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, and in the
House of Lords, also, judgment was given for the original defendant, but on
a much broader ground than in the Exchequer chamber. There was a clear
issue between the Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords as to the
principle which should govern the decision.
Burnham, supra note 59, at 235. In sum, the ouster doctrine as stated in Scott H was
effectively but indirectly rejected by a higher court.
86 Lord Campbell explained why the ouster doctrine could not stand:
That being the intention of the parties, about which I believe there is no
dispute, is the contract illegal? . . . It is contended, that it is contrary to
public policy: that is rather a dangerous ground to go upon .... Can the

public be injured by it? It seems to me that it would be a most inexpedient
encroachment upon the liberty of the subject if he were not allowed to enter
into such a contract.

Scott III, 5 H.L.C. at 852, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1138.
87 See Dugan v. Thomas, 9 A. 354, 354-55 (Me. 1887) ("Parties may by agreement
impose conditions precedent with respect to preliminary and collateral matters, such
as do not go to the root of the action. But men cannot be compelled even by their
own agreements, to mutually agree upon arbiters whose duties would, as in this case,
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Common Law Support for Arbitration

Many American courts respected the autonomy of arbitration.
Before I outline and catalog these nineteenth-century authorities, two
decisions are offered as an overview.
Larkin v. Robbins88 is a typical dispute between the opposing theories of ouster and liberty of contract. The latter principle led courts to
conclude that parties had a right to enter into a contract for private
dispute resolution procedures-like any other subject for a contract.
Larkin was a liberty-of-contract case. Once a party agreed to arbitration, this discontinued a court's jurisdiction to decide the matter de
novo.

89

Yates v. Russell9" is singled out because of the court's pragmatic
view of the underlying dispute. The matter dealt with damages from
an adulterous affair. 9 1 Upholding the arbitration agreement, the
go to the root of the principal claim or cause of action, and oust the courts of their
jurisdiction."); see also Stephenson v. Piscataqua Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 54 Me. 55, 70
(1866) ("While parties may impose, as a condition precedent to applications to the
courts, that they shall first have settled the amount to be recovered by an agreed
mode, they cannot entirely close the access to the courts of law.... Such stipulations
are repugnant to the rest of the contract and assume to divest courts of their established juisdiction. As conditions precedent to an appeal to the courts, they are
void."). The United States Supreme Court validated this view in Hamilton v. Liverpool,
London & Globe Insurance Co., 136 U.S. 242 (1890), where an insurance policy authorized arbitrators to determine the amount of loss or damages. Id. at 242-43. Referring to this partial arbitration, the Court concluded:
Such a stipulation, not ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, but leaving
the general question of liability to be judicially determined, and simply providing a reasonable method of estimating and ascertaining the amount of
the loss, is unquestionably valid, according to the uniform current of authority in England and in this country.
Id. at 255.
88 2 Wend. 505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
89 Id. at 506 ("The reason that the submission operates as a discontinuance, is not
because the subject of the suit is otherwise disposed of than by the decision of the
court in which it was prosecuted; but because the parties have selected another tribunal for the trial of it."). Giving preeminent effect to the parties' contract, Larkin
reasoned:
The court will not look to the proceedings of that tribunal to determine
whether the suit is gone beyond its jurisdiction. It is sufficient that the parties have selected their arbitrators, and concluded their agreement to submit
to them. It is this agreement which withdraws the cause from the court, and
effects the discontinuance of the suit.
Id.
90 17Johns. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
91 Id. at 466. The court explained that the adulterous affair factored into the
decision to enforce the arbitration agreement:
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court in Yates understood that the parties sought privacy to resolve
their dispute.9 2 When Yates and the judicial hostility thesis are read
side-by-side, it is hard to agree that American courts were dogmatic
foes of arbitration.
Many nineteenth-century courts favored arbitration.9 3 When
courts referred disputes to arbitration, they ended their jurisdiction.9 4
They enforced arbitration agreements. 95 Judges considered the parties' intentions to arbitrate. 9 6 Arbitration agreements precluded
courts from hearing a lawsuit that paralleled or duplicated the matter
being arbitrated. 9 7 Judges did not interfere with arbitration proceedings on technical grounds when a procedure varied from the strict
requirements of the contract.9 8
There might be, and no doubt were, very good and sufficient reasons in the
minds of the parties for withdrawing from a public trial so painful and distressing an investigation as an action for adultery involves; and I see no good
reason why the agreement of the parties to withdraw the trial from ajury to a
more retired examination, before well selected referees, should be discountenanced or rejected.
Id.
92 Id. at 465. Yates upheld the arbitrators' ruling on the theory that this was what
the parties originally intended: "It is not pretended there was any imposition or collusion in the case. It was an agreement made in good faith, and I think that good faith
requires that it should be truly and accurately observed." Id.at 465-66. The court
reasoned "that a party to that agreement must be held to be concluded by it, and that
he cannot now allege, that the reference and judgment were not warranted by law. I
think that it would be establishing a precedent that might be very pernicious in its
consequences." Id. at 466.
93 See, e.g., Neely v. Buford, 65 Mo. 448, 451 (1877) ("Courts are disposed to
regard with favor these [arbitration] tribunals of the parties' own selection, which
prevent litigation in courts and are less expensive and dilatory.").
94 See, e.g., Dorsey v. Hammond, 1 Bland. 463, 469 (Md. 1828) ("When a case is
referred to arbitrators, the Court divests itself of all judgment ....").
95 See, e.g., Pike v. Emerson, 5 N.H. 393, 393 (1831) ("We have no doubt, that an
attorney has authority, by an [arbitration] agreement put upon file, in a cause, to
bind his client, and that such an agreement may, in many cases, be specially
enforced."); Camp v. Root, 18Johns. 22, 23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) ("The submission to
arbitration was a discontinuance of the suit.").
96 See, e.g., Henry v. Porter, 29 Ala. 619, 622 (1857) ("Whether a submission to
arbitration, or an award, will work the dismissal of a pending suit, must depend on the
intention of the parties, to be gathered from the facts of each particular case .... ).
97 See, e.g., Dederick's Adm'rs v. Richley, 19 Wend. 108, 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838)
("The principle upon which the cases proceed seems to be this: if the parties agree to
an unauthorized reference, it amounts to nothing more than an arbitration; the suit is
at an end-the court has no longer any jurisdiction over the parties, and will take no
further cognizance of the matter.").
98 See, e.g., Howard v. Conro, 2 Vt. 492, 494 (1829) ("If [the parties] mutually
agree to dispense with the attendance of one of the referees, and in pursuance of
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Some courts refused to allow parties to revoke an arbitrator's
authority after the matter was referred to arbitration but before issuance of an award. 99 Others refused pre-award revocations to protect
the parties' investment of time and costs in a hearing.1 00 Courts were
especially supportive of arbitrations after the process ran its full
course and an award was issued. Judges believed that awards should
be enforced. 10 1 Awards were reviewed with more deferential stan10 2
dards than appellate courts used to review trial court rulings.
Courts emphatically rejected revocations after an award was
03

rendered. 1

such agreement appear and submit to a hearing before the other two . . . it is not
competent for either party... to urge the absence of the third referee as an objection
to the report.").
99 See, e.g., Bank of Monroe v. Widner, 11 Paige Ch. 529, 534 (N.Y. Ch. 1845)
("[A]t the common law, it was competent for one of the parties to a submission to
arbitration, to revoke the submission at any time before the award was actually made,
and ready to be delivered to the parties. But the revised statutes have wisely provided
that neither party, to a submission to arbitration, shall have power to revoke such
submission after the cause has been finally submitted to the arbitrator . . . for his
decision. And this court has decided that the statutory provision on this subject,
applies to all cases of submission to arbitration." (citations omitted)).
100 See, e.g., Paist v. Caldwell, 75 Pa. 161, 166 (1874) ("The parties agreed to consolidate these actions and try them before referees, who should render a final award
whether the defendant should pay anything, and if any, how much ....
Here valuable rights were released and acquired on each side, and the effect of the settlement
on this basis was to put an end to litigation ruinous to both sides ....

Under such

circumstances, it was not in the power of the defendant at the last moment, and after
the referees had gone far into the case, suddenly to give a notice of revocation, and
avert a result.").
101 See, e.g., Garitee v. Carter, 16 Md. 309, 312 (1860) ("'[A] more liberal and
reasonable interpretation of awards is now adopted by the courts than formerly
existed. Every reasonable intendment will be made in their favor, and a construction
given to them that will support them if possible ...

.'"

(quoting Roloson v. Carson, 8

Md. 208, 225-26 (1855))).
102 See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 66 Barb. 209, 210 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1870) ("[A]n
agreement to arbitrate a pending suit operates as a discontinuance of the suit as an
action; but nevertheless if the agreement provides for ajudgment to be entered in the
action, such judgment may be entered, and stand as a judgment by consent, which
cannot be set aside in the ordinary way by which errors are corrected.").
103 See, e.g., McGheehen v. Duffield, 5 Pa. 497, 500 (1847) ("[T]he umpire had
heard the parties and made his award before the defendants act of revocation. They
were too late, as a submission cannot be revoked after award. . . ."); Rogers' Heirs v.

Nail, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 29, 30 (1845) ("But in this case the award was made and
published to the parties before any attempt was made to revoke the authority of the
arbitrators. It is manifestly absurd to assume that an authority already exercised can
be countermanded. The attempt to revoke the submission in this case, therefore,
comes too late.").
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Courts treated awards as final and binding.10 4 They favored the
procedural simplicity 1°5 and efficiency' 0 6 of arbitration. Arbitrators
could not withdraw their rulings.' 0 7 Where only two out of three arbitrators signed an award, courts enforced the ruling.' 0 8 Where parties
authorized a panel of arbitrators to rule on their dispute, withdrawal
by one arbitrator did not deprive the remaining arbitrators of authority to render an enforceable award.' 0 9 In one case, an award was
enforced after it was amended to include payment of forum costs. 10
Courts enforced arbitration agreements that consented to judicial enforcement of the award." Courts believed they had authority
104 See, e.g., Tankersley v. Richardson, 2 Stew. 130, 132 (Ala. 1829) ("The adjustment of controversies and suits by arbitration, is a species of remedy much favored by
legislation; so much so, that, not only what can be, is intended in its favor, but it will
not be permitted to be impugned for any extrinsic cause; unless it be founded in
corruption, partiality or other undue means.").
105 See, e.g., Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (Mich. 1888) ("[Awards] are made
by a tribunal of the parties' own selection, who are usually, at least, expected to act in
their own view of law and testimony more freely and less technically than courts and
regular juries.").
106 See, e.g., Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige Ch. 124, 138 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) ("If every
party who arbitrates, in relation to a contested claim, to save trouble and expense, is
to be subjected to a chancery suit, and to several hundred dollars cost, if the arbitrators happen to err upon a doubtful question as to the admissibility of a witness, the
sooner these domestic tribunals of the parties' own selection are abolished, the better. Such a principle is wholly inconsistent with common sense, and cannot be the
law of a court of equity.").
107 See, e.g., Patton v. Baird, 42 N.C. (7 Ired. Eq.) 255, 260 (1851) ("After an award
is made, the arbitrators are 'functi officio,' and have no more power to alter it, than a
jury has to change their verdict, after it is rendered, and they are discharged.").
108 See, e.g., Campbell, 3 Paige Ch. at 138 n.1 ("Submission to the arbitration of
three or any two, two join in the award giving notice of the award concluded, and
being about to be returned to the third, who does not join in it; held, that this is no
objection to the validity of the award.").
109 See, e.g., Kile v. Chapin, 9 Ind. 150, 152 (1857) ("Even when several arbitrators
are appointed by the parties, and one refuses to act, the award of the other arbitrators
will be valid. For the law will not put it in the power of one arbitrator to defeat the
submission by withdrawing from the trust.").
110 See, e.g., Dudley v. Thomas, 23 Cal. 365, 368 (1863) ("The arbitrators have
power to award costs, though no mention be made of costs in the submission, as it is a
matter within the terms of a general reference."). The appeal contended that when
the arbitrators amended the award by billing costs of the arbitration, this was an
amendment of the award. Id. A common law rule provided that after an award was
made and delivered, the arbitrators could not alter it, even to correct mistakes. Id.
But the Dudley court distinguished the award of costs, reasoning: "We are satisfied that
the execution of this subsequent instrument did not vitiate the original award, which
remained unaltered by the arbitrators." Id.
111 See, e.g., Hughes v. Bywater, 4 Hill 551, 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) ("[T]he stipulation in this instrument of submission [to arbitration] is the same thing as if it had
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to enforce arbitrator rulings, 12 even erroneous ones. 113 When awards
were partially defective, courts enforced the valid portion of the arbi14
trator's ruling.'
3.

Early Supreme Court Rulings Mirrored the Common Law's
Mixed Approach to Arbitration

My historical analysis closes with one more example of the FAA's
intellectual vacuum. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the
judicial hostility thesis. 115 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 1 16 informs us that
"English courts traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts of jurisdiction, and refused to enforce
such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by American
courts as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of
1 17
the Arbitration Act."
Oddly, the Court failed to contemplate its own nineteenth-century experience with arbitration. Justices decided two arbitration

expressly authorized the entry ofjudgment by an attorney. It is virtually saying to the
plaintiff, 'if the award be against me, I waive my right to insist on a special motion.'
...An agreement to arbitrate discontinues a cause.").
112 See, e.g., Green v. Patchin, 13 Wend. 293, 295-96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) ("Where
ajudgment has been entered according to the written agreement of the parties, without fraud, the court will permit the parties to enforce it, and will not interfere to set it
aside, or examine its merits."); Farrington v. Hamblin, 12 Wend. 212, 214 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1834) ("The arbitrators were not officers of the court, but judges of the parties'
own choosing. The court had no control over them; and but for the stipulation to
enter judgment, the court would not entertain any motion in relation to the subject."
(citation omitted)).
113 See, e.g., Winship v. Jewett, 1 Barb. Ch. 173, 184 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) ("[I]t is well
settled that the award, if made in good faith, is conclusive upon the parties; and that
neither of them can be permitted to prove that the arbitrators decided wrong, either
as to the law or the facts of the case.").
114 See, e.g., Brown v. Warnock, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 492, 493 (1837) ("An award.., if
void as to the costs ...would still be good for the debt, as an award may be good in
part, and bad in part."); Banks v. Adams, 23 Me. 259, 261 (1843) ("An award may be
good for part and bad for part; and the part, which is good, will be sustained, if it be
not so connected with the part, which is bad, that injustice will thereby be done.").
115
116
117

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Id. at 510 n.4.
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cases in this period.' I Their mixed treatment of arbitration is consistent with the common law findings in Burnham's 1897 study."l

9

Carnochan v. Christie120 reversed a lower court ruling that upheld
a commercial arbitration award. Notably, the lower court enforced

the arbitrator's award. 12 1 This outcome is counter to the inaccurate
picture painted by Cohen and FAA supporters. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Carnochan reversed the award-confirmation rul-

ing. 12 2 However, he ruled on narrow grounds, 12 3 and found no fault
with the arbitration per se.'

24

Later, Lutz v. LinthicumI 2 5 strongly supported arbitration. The
parties agreed to arbitrate a lease dispute. By court order, two arbitrators were appointed and the decree also authorized their selection of
a third neutral. 2 6 After the panel rendered an award for damages

payable to the evicted lessee, a lower court entered judgment on the
27

award. 1

Lutz, the losing party, raised several objections to the award. It
was not final and definite; the appointment of the third arbitrator did
not conform to the public policy of Maryland; and delivery of the
118 A third Supreme Court arbitration decision occurred soon after the nineteenth century ended. Colombia v. Cauca Co., 190 U.S. 524 (1903), is another example
of pre-FAAjudicial deference to arbitration. After a U.S. company became entangled
in a contract dispute with the government of Colombia to build a railroad in that
nation, a three-member arbitration panel was appointed. Id. at 527. One arbitrator
was appointed by the company, and another by Colombia. Id. The governments of
Colombia and the U.S. co-selected the third arbitrator. Id. At the close of the hearings, Colombia withdrew its arbitrator and failed to appoint a replacement. Id. The
remaining arbitrators rendered an award for the company, prompting Colombia to
argue that the resignation of its arbitrator made the award void. Id. at 526-28. Justice
Holmes' decision confirmed the award, reasoning that when the two governments
and company established the arbitration panel, "it was not expected that a commission made up as this was would be unanimous." Id. at 528. Rather, the parties had
"resolved, under the powers given to it in the agreement, that a majority vote should
govern. Obviously that was the only possible way, as each party appointed a representative of its side." Id. The Court concluded: "We are satisfied that an award by a
majority was sufficient and effective." Id.
119 Burnham, supra note 59, at 234.
120 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 446 (1826).
121 Id. at 459.
122 Id. at 466.
123 Id. (ruling that the award was indefinite as to when a credit was due to one of
the parties, and therefore, the arbitrators' ruling was not final).
124 Id. ("[T]the award ought itself to settle finally and conclusively the whole matter referred to them.").
125 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 165 (1834).
126 Id. at 168.
127 Id. at 169.
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award to the losing party did not conform to the strict requirements of
statutory law. 1 28 Citing treatises and common law precedents, Justice
Story rejected these arguments in a thoroughly contemporary sound29

ing decision. 1

These nineteenth-century Supreme Court rulings vanished over
time. Only four courts have cited Carnochansince 1925, the year that
the FAA was enacted-and all are at the state level. 13 0 Only three federal courts have cited Lutz since 1925.131 No Supreme Court decision
in the post-FAA era has cited either decision. This disappearing lineage is sobering proof of the modern-day amnesia caused by the FAA's
judicial hostility thesis.
III.

STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ARBITRATION

A.

AWARDs

The FederalArbitration Act

While Congress was preoccupied with enforcing arbitration
agreements, 132 it gave little thought to standards for vacating an
award. The 1924 House Report stated: "The award may then be
entered as a judgment, subject to attack by the other party for fraud
and corruption and similar undue influence, or for palpable error in
form." 3 3 The 1924 Senate Report stated that the award could be set
aside where it was secured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; if
there was partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators; in a
situation where an arbitrator was guilty of misconduct or refused to
hear evidence; because of prejudicial misbehavior by the parties; or
where an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers.1 34 The Senate
included a significant excerpt from a lawyer's brief as its main evidence of intent on award enforcement:
128 See id. at 169-70.
129 See id. at 178-79 ("But, prima facie the award is to be taken to have been regularly made, where there is nothing on its face to impeach it.").
130 See Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 260 P.2d 156, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953);
Cont'l Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp. of Am., 48 A.2d 447, 451 (Md. 1946);
Mueller v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 259 N.W. 798, 801 (Minn. 1935), overruled by Eisen v.
State, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 352 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1984); State v. N. Packing Co.,
244 N.W. 31, 32 (N.D. 1932).
131 See Citizens Bldg. of W. Palm Beach, Inc. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 120 F.2d 982,
984 n.2 (5th Cir. 1941); Union R.R. Co. v. Nat'il R.R. Adjustment Bd., Fourth Div., 170
F. Supp. 281, 289 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1958); Seldner Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 22 F. Supp.
388, 392 (D. Md. 1938).
132 See supra notes 48, 55.
133 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
134 S. REP. No. 68-536, at 4 (1924).
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The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a
matter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced. This exists
only when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or
when the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers
or were influenced by other undue means-cases in which enforcement would obviously be unjust. There is no authority and no
opportunity for the court, in connection with the award, to inject its
135
own ideas of what the award should have been.
Section 10 codifies these grounds to vacate an award. 13 6 The FAA
added a critical layer of review by preserving dual and concurrent
roles for state and federal courts-a feature that now complicates
review of awards. Section 9, which specifies rules for reviewing
37
awards, authorizes a reviewing role for state courts.
B.

The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000

Forty-nine states have arbitration laws. Before 2000, thirty-five
states adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), while fourteen
adopted similar legislation. 138 The UAA was proposed in 1955, sup3 9
posedly to repeal state laws that obstructed arbitration agreements.'
135 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 36 (statement of W.W. Nichols, President, American Manufacturers' Association of New York). The legislative reports and debates
said nothing as to whether post-award and state court litigation rules should be preempted by the new federal law.
136 See United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)), authorizing courts to vacate an award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

Id. § 10.
137 Id. § 9 ("If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to
the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.").
138 UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT prefatory note (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 2 (2005).
139 See id.
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Many state laws contain the four statutory standards in section 10 of
the FAA, 140 and add a fifth ground for vacatur.14
This fairly uniform approach was fragmented after 2000, when
the RUAA was approved. In a recent survey of all state laws, the American Arbitration Association reports that twelve states adopted the
RUAA. 142 The revised vacatur standards, appearing in RUAA Section
23, added a sixth element. This section also made other amendments

140 See supra note 136.
141 UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr §§ 1-25 (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 101 (2005). Section 12, "Vacating an Award," states:
a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the
rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact
that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a
court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm
the award.
Id. § 12, at 497.
UAA vacatur standards appear in Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.120 (2006)); Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1512 (2003 & Supp. 2006)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-108-212 (2006)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-912 (2004)); Illinois (710
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12 (West 2007)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 34-57-2-13 (1999));
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (2001)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.160
(West 2006)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938 (2003)); Massachusetts
(MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 150C, § 12 (1999)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.19
(West 2000 & Supp. 2007)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.405 (West 1992 & Supp.
2007)); Montana (MONT.CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (2007)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-2613 (1995 & Supp. 2006)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE. ANN. § 15-48-130
(2005)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-25A-24 (2004)); Tennessee (TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-5-213 (2007)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581 (2007)). Alaska
and Colorado retain the UAA structure but also adopted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. See infra note 142.
142 See RUAA and UMA Legislationfrom Coast to Coast, DIsP. RESOL. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2005, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=26600. The states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii,
Nevada, NewJersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Utah, and Washington. Id.
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within the structure of the four FAA standards and the fifth standard
1 43
in the UAA.
The RUAA drafters identified fourteen issues to resolve in contemporary arbitration. 144 They believed that courts must play a larger
role to ensure fairness in arbitration. The RUAA is premised on the
143 See UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 23 (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 73 (2005). In
reproducing the vacatur provision, I italicize all additions to section 10 of the FAA,
and italicize and underline additions to section 12 of the UAA:
Section 23. Vacating Award.
(a) Upon [motion] to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding
if:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means;
(2) there was:
(A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
(B) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(C) misconduct by an arbitratorprdudicingthe rights of a party to the
arbitrationproceedin,

(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of
sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing
contrary to Section 15, so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party to the arbitration proceeding;
(4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
(5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in
the arbitrationproceeding without raising the objection under Section 15(c)
not later than the beginning of the arbitrationhearing; or
(6) the arbitrationwas conducted without proper notice of the initiationof
an arbitrationas required in Section 9 so as to prejudice substantially the
rights of a party to the arbitrationproceeding

144 See id. prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. at 2-3 (listing "(1) who decides the arbitrability
of a dispute and by what criteria; (2) whether a court or arbitrators may issue provisional remedies; (3) how a party can initiate an arbitration proceeding; (4) whether
arbitration proceedings may be consolidated; (5) whether arbitrators are required to
disclose facts reasonably likely to affect impartiality; (6) what extent arbitrators or an
arbitration organization are immune from civil actions; (7) whether arbitrators or
representatives of arbitration organizations may be required to testify in another proceeding; (8) whether arbitrators have the discretion to order discovery, issue protective orders, decide motions for summary dispositions, hold prehearing conferences
and otherwise manage the arbitration process; (9) when a court may enforce a
preaward ruling by an arbitrator; (10) what remedies an arbitrator may award, especially in regard to attorney's fees, punitive damages or other exemplary relief; (11)
when a court can award attorney's fees and costs to arbitrators and arbitration organizations; (12) when a court can award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party in
an appeal of an arbitrator's award; and (13) which sections of the UAA would not be
waivable . ..particularly in those instances in which one party may have significantly
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belief that arbitration should be a consensual process. 4 5 In addition,
the RUAA broke new ground by regulating arbitrator neutrality. 14 6
The revised Act expanded arbitrator powers by authorizing discovery
and other protective orders, rulings on motions for summary judgment, prehearing conferences and other actions that manage the
arbitration process. 14 7 A new rule empowered courts, during the
hearing phase, to enforce a pre-award ruling by an arbitrator. 48
Drafters regulated the remedial boundary that overlaps arbitration and courts. 149 A new section prescribed arbitrator remedies,
including attorney's fees, punitive damages, and other exemplary
relief. 150 The RUAA also allows courts to award attorney's fees and
5
costs to a prevailing party in an appeal of an arbitrator's award.' '

The RUAA drafters recognized the need for arbitral finality.1 52
The revised regulations were designed to facilitate "the relative speed,
lower cost, and greater efficiency of the [arbitration] process."'1 53 In
particular, they acknowledged that "in most cases parties intend the
decisions of arbitrators to be final with minimal court involvement
unless there is clear unfairness or a denial of justice.

'154

I close this discussion by suggesting that the RUAA drafters cannot simultaneously improve fairness and finality in arbitration. Later,
I present data to show that the RUAA is significantly eroding award
finality. 155 For now, my discussion is confined to the assertion by
drafters that "in most cases parties intend the decisions of arbitrators
to be final with minimal court involvement unless there is clear unfairness or a denial of justice." 1 56 The italicized text underscores a major
less bargaining power than another; and (14) the use of electronic information ... in
the arbitration process").
145 Id., 7 U.L.A. at 3. ("[A]rbitration is a consensual process in which autonomy of
the parties who enter into arbitration agreements should be given primary consideration, so long as their agreements conform to notions of fundamental fairness.").
146 Id. § 12, 7 U.L.A. at 42.
147 Id. § 17, 7 U.L.A. at 57.
148 Id. § 18, 7 U.L.A. at 62.
149 Id. § 21, 7 U.L.A. at 69.
150

Id.

151 Id. § 25, 7 U.L.A. at 85.
152 Id. § 25 cmt. 3, 7 U.L.A. at 86 ("Section 25(c) promotes the statutory policy of
finality of arbitration awards by adding a provision for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable expenses of litigation to prevailing parties in contested judicial actions to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an award.").
153 Id. prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. at 86.
154
155

Id.
See infra Part V.

156 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACr prefatory note (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 86 (2005)
(emphasis added).
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philosophical difference between the RUAA drafters and the FAA
Congress. The FAA was passed to make arbitration a quick, efficient,
low-cost alternative to courts.' 57 The RUAA drafters paid lip service to
these values, but their overriding concern was to make arbitration
fairer for parties who are vulnerable to overreaching by the scrivener
of the arbitration agreement.
The RUAA drafters cannot have it both ways-preserving award
finality while ensuring that arbitration is free from "clear unfairness
and denial of justice." This is because "clear unfairness" and "denial
ofjustice" lack objective tests.
The RUAA drafters also underestimate the tendency by sore
losers in arbitration to challenge the results of their private adjudication. The very limited judicial review standards in the FAA deter these
challenges. But each fairness procedure in the RUAA, acting in combination with expanded judicial review, increases the likelihood of
involving courts in reviewing award challenges.
IV.

USING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS TO ANALYZE JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION

A.

AwARDs

Method for Creating the Sample

58
I used research methods from my earlier empirical studies.'
The sample was derived from Westlaw's Internet service. Because
Congress allowed parties to choose federal or state courts to contest
awards, I used federal and state law databases. The search used
keywords from terms in the FAA, RUAA, and state arbitration laws. 159
The sample focused on employment arbitrations. To be
included, a case involved a post-award dispute between an individual
employee and the employer in which an arbitrator's ruling was challenged by either party. Arbitration cases involving a union and
employer were not included because these adjudications are no
longer regulated under the FAA. Instead, court review occurs under

157

See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) ("It is practically appropriate that the

action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation.").
158 See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Turns: New Evidence
on the Finalityof Labor ArbitrationAwards, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 202-03 (2007);
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, PrivateJustice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The
Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIo ST. J. ON Dsp. RESOL. 19, 45-48
(2001) (hereinafter LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice]; Michael H. LeRoy & Peter
Feuille, Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court Review of Punitive Awards in Labor and
Employment Arbitrations, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 199, 230-34 (2006).
159 E.g., "procured by corruption," "evident partiality," "refusing to postpone the
hearing," "arbitrators exceeded their powers," and "imperfectly executed."
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section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 160 When judges
review labor arbitration awards, they apply federal common law principles from three closely integrated decisions, now called the Steelworkers
Tilogy. 161
The sample had no historical limit. The earliest decision was
reported in 1975.162 Sampling ended in April 2007. After a potential
case was identified, I read it to see if it met the inclusion criteria. For
example, pre-arbitration disputes over enforcement of an arbitration
clause were excluded. Cases were included, on the other hand, where
employees resisted arbitration, were compelled to arbitrate their
claims, and were later involved in a post-award lawsuit. 163 Some cases
involved employees who preferred court to arbitration but prevailed
in the private forum, leading the employer to seek vacatur. 164
Once a case met the criteria, it was checked against a roster of
previously read and coded cases to avoid duplication. 16 5 Next, relevant data were taken from each case. Variables included (1) state or
federal court, (2) first court ruling on motion to confirm or vacate an
award, and (3) appellate ruling on motion to confirm or vacate an
award. Other data were collected and analyzed for a companion

study. 166
160 Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 136, 156-57 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2000)).
161 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
162 McClure v. Montgomery County Cmty. Action Agency, No. 4798, 1975 WL
181652 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1975).

163 See, e.g., Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2004)
(upholding the denial of a judicial stay where an arbitration panel had dismissed a
terminated employee's sexual harassment claims).
164 In Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 883 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), an
employee sued but was ordered by the court to arbitrate his claim. After he prevailed
and was awarded $250,000, the employer sued to vacate the award, but the court
denied the motion. Id. at 83.
165 In rare cases, an award was challenged once and remanded to arbitration; after
arbitrators ruled again, the award was challenged a second time. These award reviews
were treated as separate cases, even though the parties and dispute were unchanged,
because the awards differed. See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 286,
287-88 (App. Div. 2005) (affirming lower court vacatur of punitive damages and
remanding to a new arbitration panel); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d
264, 268-69, 277 (App. Div. 2003) (remanding to the original panel of arbitrators for
reconsideration of punitive damages).
166 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Arbitration Has No
Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HIARv. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 19, on
file with author) (reporting on a recent spurt of award-review cases, exemplified by
the finding that 64.9% of federal district courts' award-review decisions occurred
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FAIRNESS?

Method for ComparingReversal Rates by Courts

My research is designed to measure vacatur rates by federal and
state courts at the initial and appellate stages of judicial review.
Unless these rates are extremely low or high, they are hard to interpret. As I conducted my empirical analysis, I also researched similar
studies-other statistical measures of appellate courts that are petitioned to overturn a lower court or agency ruling. My analysis and
those studies measure reversal rates in adjudications.
Comparative data improves my ability to assess whether judicial
deference to awards is insufficient, moderate, or excessive. This judgment can be partly made by understanding what a legislature
intended for the scope of court review. The other part of this quantitative judgment is informed by considering the intent behind the
FAA. Recalling my earlier discussion, Congress barely considered the
issue of award enforcement. 167 Still, it is reasonable to infer that Congress intended low vacatur activity. This is because the FAA was meant
to end judicial hostility to arbitration.1 68
But how low is low for a vacatur rate? Table 1 helps to answer
that question by depicting appellate reversal rates in other studies,
and arranging them by levels. I created a simple hierarchy for these
studies: courts review with extreme deference (reversal rate 8.0% or
less), great deference (reversal rate 8.1% to 16.0%), high deference
(reversal rate 16.1% to 24.0%), moderate deference (reversal rate
24.1% to 32.0%), slight deference (reversal rate 32.1% to 40.0%), and
no deference (reversal rate 40.1% or more).

since 2000). Courts will likely face a growing docket of post-arbitration appeals as
parties seek to relitigate the claims that were privately adjudicated. This upsurge also
suggests that employment arbitration serves too many masters-an uncoordinated
array of legislatures and courts that regulate this process-despite the fact that the
FAA appears to legislate uniform standards. Id.
167 See supra Part III.A.
168 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF RULINGS BY

LOWER COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AGENCIES:

A

WIDE RANGE OF REVERSAL RATES

Level of Deference by
Appellate Court

Extreme Deference
Reversal Rate 8.0% or Less

Great Deference
Reversal Rate Between 8.1%
and 16.0%

Reversal Rate by
Appellate Court
6.0% Reversal of Employer
Dismissals of Employment
Discrimination Lawsuits
(Clermont & Eisenberg, 2002)
7.4% Reversal by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit of Lower Court Rulings,
2005 (Catterson, 2006)
9.1% Reversal by all Federal
Courts of Appeals, 2005
(Catterson, 2006)
14.7% Reversal by Federal
Appeals Courts of NLRB Rulings
of Union Liability
(Brudney, 1996)
19.7% Reversal by Federal
Appeals Courts of NLRB Rulings
of Employer Liability
(Brudney, 1996)

High Deference
Reversal Rate Between 16.1%
and 24.0%

22.0% Reversal by Federal
Appeals Courts of Jury Patent
Rulings (Moore, 2000)
22.0% Reversal by Federal
Appeals Courts of Judges' Patent
Rulings (Moore, 2000)
28.2% Reversal by Federal District
Courts of Labor Arbitration
Awards, 1960-1991
(LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)

Moderate Deference
Reversal Rate Between 24.1%
and 32.0%

29.5% Reversal by Federal
Appeals Courts of Labor
Arbitration Awards, 1961-1991
(LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)
29.7% Reversal by Federal District
Courts of Labor Arbitration
Awards, 1991-2001
(LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)

Slight Deference
Reversal Rate Between 32.1%
and40.0%

33.6% Reversal by Federal
Appeals Courts of Labor
Arbitration Awards, 1991-2001
(LeRoy & Feuille, 2001)

No Deference
Reversal Rate of 40.1% and Above

Death Penalty
Reversal of
66% Sentences
in Nebraska
ba20)
(eaedus e
(Baldus et al., 2002)
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Extreme Deference (Reversal Rate 8.0% or Less): A study by Kevin
Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg examined appellate court reversal
of lower courts in the federal system. 169 In employment discrimination cases, appellate courts reversed less than 6.0% of wins by employers at trial. 1 70 This is an extreme example of appellate court
deference.
Cathy Catterson's recent study of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit provides a second example of extreme judicial deference. 17 1 The research was related to a study by the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. 72 Chaired
by retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White, the Commission studied the possibility of splitting this overburdened circuit. 173 Catterson's
study showed that as the circuit's caseload has mushroomed from
1945 to 2005, appellate courts have reversed far fewer rulings. 174 The
reversal rate in 2005, 7.4%,175 was due to diminishing judicial
76
resources. 1
GreatDeference (ReversalRate Between 8.1% and 16.0 %): Catterson's
study also measured the reversal rate for all federal appeals courts and
found that they reversed 9.1% of lower rulings in 2005.177 She suggested this was due to channeling of complex litigation-a prime sub78
ject of appeals and subsequent reversals-to ADR venues.
James Brudney analyzed 1224 National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) decisions that were appealed to federal courts.' 79 Over time,
courts reversed fewer rulings. 80 From 1960 to 1992, they enforced
169 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts:
Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947.
170 Id. at 957. Clermont and Eisenberg interpreted this result to mean that appellate courts may have an anti-plaintiff bias. See id. at 957-58.
171 Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing,48 Agiz. L. REv.
287 (2006).
172 Id. at 288.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 289 tbl.1. The reversal rate was 32.1% in 1945, 22.5% in 1955, 23.6% in
1965, 21.4% in 1975, 18.2% in 1985, 9.3% in 1995, and 7.4% in 2005. Id.
175 Id.
176 Appellate judgeships rose from thirteen in 1945 to twenty-eight in 2005, while
the caseload grew by 500%. Id. at 293.
177 Id. at 289 tbl.1. The reversal rate was 27.9% in 1945, 26.9% in 1955, 22.0% in
1965, 17.8% in 1975, 15.8% in 1985, and 9.3% in 1995. Id.
178 Id. at 291.
179 James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective BargainingProtectionsand the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 945 (1996).
180 Id. at 969-70. He attributes the declining rate of reversal to fewer doctrinal
conflicts and disagreements in interpreting the NLRA. Id.
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only 66.9% of NLRB orders. 181 The rate varied, however.' 8 2 Courts
reviewed NLRB decisions with great deference in cases where a union
violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). These rulings
83
were reversed in only 14.7% of cases.'
High Deference (Reversal Rate Between 16.1% and 24.0%): Brudney's
study found an area where courts were highly deferential, but reversed
more NLRB rulings. When an employer violated the NLRA, courts
184
reversed 19.7% of these cases.
Kimberly Moore's study on appellate review of patent judgments
from trial judges and juries is an example of moderately deferential
review.18 5 Moore asked whether federal appeals courts were more
inclined to overturn jury verdicts or judge rulings.18 6 She expected a
higher reversal rate for jury verdicts but found that appeals courts
87
affirmed at the same rate-78%-for judge and jury verdicts.'
Table 1 converts the 78% affirmance rate to a 22% reversal rate.
ModerateDeference (Reversal Rate Between 24.1 % and 32.0 %): In two
studies, Michael H. LeRoy and Peter Feuille analyzed 1783 federal
court rulings on labor arbitration awards rendered from 1960 through
2001.188 In the first study, award confirmation rates by district and
appellate courts from 1960-1991 were, respectively, 71.8% and
70.5%.189
In a more recent study that examined court rulings from
1991-2001, LeRoy and Feuille observed very similar confirmation
rates. District courts enforced 70.3% of all challenged awards, and
181

Id. at 970 n.93.

182 Id. ("The rate of success ... was below 60% in the 1960s, rose to 72% in the
early 1970s, declined slightly to 65% in the early 1980s, and was above 75% from
1985-92.").
183 Id. at 972 & 973 tbl.2.
184 Id. at 972 & 973 tbl.1.
185 Kimberly A. Moore, Judges,Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000).
186 Id. at 367-68.
187 Id. at 397 tbl.6.
188 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance ArbitrationAppeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 78, 98 (1992) [hereinafter LeRoy & Feuille, Steelworkers Trilogy]. This research analyzed "1,148 federal
district court decisions and 480 federal circuit court decisions that resulted in a court
order which compelled or denied arbitration or which enforced or vacated an arbitrator's award in whole or in part." Id. These decisions were published from June 24,
1960 to July 24, 1990. Id. at 98 n.105. A follow-up study reported data for court
review of awards from 1991 to 2001. See LeRoy & Feuille, PrivateJustice, supra note
158, at 50 tbl.1.
189 LeRoy & Feuille, Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 188, at 102 tbl.3.
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appellate courts confirmed 70.5% of awards.' 90 As with the Moore
study, Table 1 converts the award confirmation rate to a reversal vacatur rate.
Slight Deference (Reversal Rate Between 30.1 % and 40.0%): LeRoy
and Feuille's 2001 study showed an example of slight judicial deference. Federal appeals courts confirmed 66.4% of labor awards. 19 '
Table 1 converts this to a 33.6% reversal rate.
No Deference (Reversal Rate 40.1 % or More): A Nebraska study of
death penalty reversals provided an example of no appellate deference to lower court rulings. 192 On appeal, courts vacated nineteen of
twenty-nine death penalty sentences, or 66%. 193 The high reversal
rate reflected the "arbitrariness and comparative injustice in the
194
administration of the death penalty."'
V.

EMPIRICAL

FINDINGS: QUANTITATIVE

AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS

A.

StatisticalFindings and QuantitativeAssessment

Table 2 shows that parties challenged 254 individual employment
arbitration awards. Many challenges were appealed after a first court
ruling. There were 150 federal district and 81 appeals court rulings,
yielding a federal sample of 231 cases. States use different names for
courts that conduct first review of awards (e.g., "Circuit Court" or
"Superior Court"). These tribunals are generically called first-level
courts. The sample contained 104 first-level courts, and 91 appellate
court rulings, yielding a state sample of 195 cases. Combining federal
and state court rulings, the sample contained 426 cases.

190

LeRoy & Feuille, PrivateJustice, supra note 158, at 49. The authors also found

that southern circuits confirmed only 59% of awards while courts in the rest of the
nation confirmed 79%. Id. at 85-86.
191 •Id. at 49.
192 David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrarinessand Discriminationin the Administration of the
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81
NEB. L. REv. 486, 512 (2002).
193 Id. Analyzing the nineteen reversals, the study found that 68% (thirteen out of
nineteen) were decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court either on direct appeal or in
post-conviction proceedings, while 32% (six out of nineteen) resulted from a federal
court. Id. at 545 fig.I.
194 Id. at 496.
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INITIAL COURT RULINGS ON AWARDS: CONFIRMATION OF

ARBITRATOR AwARDS By FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AND

FIRST-LEVEL STATE COURTS
Partially Confirm/

Confirm Award

Partially Vacate
Award

Vacate Award

Federal District
Court Decisions

139/150 (92.7%)

3/150 (2.0%)

8/150 (5.3%)

State Court
Decisions

82/104 (78.8%)

3/104 (2.9%)

19/104 (18.3%)

Total
X2 = 11.220,
df 2 (Sig. 0.004)

TABLE

3.

27/254 (10.6%)

6/254 (2.4%)

221/254 (87.0%)

1

1

APPELLATE COURT RULINGS ON AwARDS: CONFIRMATION OF

ARBITRATOR AWARDS BY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND
STATE APPELLATE COURTS

Partially Confirm/

Federal Appellate

Confirm Award

Partially Vacate
Award

Vacate Award

71/81 (87.7%)

2/81 (2.5%)

8/81 (9.9%)

65/91 (71.4%)

10/91 (11.0%)

16/91 (17.6%)

136/172 (79.6%)

12/172 (7.0%)

24/172 (14.0%)

Court Decisions
State Appellate
Court Decisions

Total
X2 = 7.709,
df 2 (Sig. 0.021)

I

Finding No. 1: Federal district and appellate courts review
awards, respectively, with extreme deference and great deference.
Federal district courts confirmed 139 awards in 150 cases. The 92.7%
confirmation figure translates to a vacatur rate of 7.3%. This compares to the extreme deference of the Ninth Circuit in Catterson's
study. 195 Federal appeals courts showed great deference but not
extreme deference, confirming 71 awards in 81 cases. This translates
196
to a 12.3% vacatur rate, similar to a finding in Brudney's study.
The highly deferential results are reflected in the language that federal courts use to describe the scope of review under the FAA:
195
196

See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
Brudney, supra note 179, at 973 tbl.2.
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"Maximum deference is owed to the arbitrator's decision," and the
standard of review of arbitration awards "is among the narrowest
known to law."
"Once an arbitration award is entered, the finality that courts
should afford the arbitration process weighs heavily in favor of the
award, and courts must exercise great caution when asked to set
aside an award. Because a primary purpose behind arbitration
agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of court proceedings,
it is well settled that judicial review of an arbitration award is very
19 7
narrowly limited."'
Finding No. 2: State first-level and appellate courts review awards,
respectively, with high deference and moderate deference. First-level
state courts confirmed 82 awards in 104 cases. This 78.8% confirmation rate translates to a 21.2% vacatur rate. The figure is similar to the
result in Moore's study. 19 8 State appellate courts were less deferential
than their lower courts. They confirmed 65 of 91 awards for a confirmation rate of 71.4%. Converted to a vacatur rate of 28.6%, this result
compares to the findings in LeRoy and Feuille's study.' 9 9
Finding No. 3: There was a statistically significant difference in
federal and state award confirmation rates. First-level state courts confirmed 92.7% of awards compared to 78.8% for state counterparts.
The difference in confirmation rates was 13.9%. This result was statistically significant at the 0.004 level. 200 Appellate courts registered a
wider difference, as federal courts confirmed 87.7% of awards compared to 71.4% of state courts. The difference in confirmation rates
was 16.3%. Due to the smaller sample size, the strength of statistical
significance was lower compared to first level courts. However, the
difference was significant at the 0.02 level. 20 1
B.

Case Analysis and QualitativeAssessment

The findings show that federal and state courts behave differently
in enforcing employment arbitration awards. The data do not explain
what causes these disparities. I suggest that substantive provisions in
federal and state arbitration statutes-not judges or differences in
197 Durkin v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Corp., 986 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (D. Kan. 1997)
(citation omitted) (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462-63
(10th Cir. 1995)).
198 See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
199 LeRoy & Feuille, PrivateJustice, supra note 158, at 45-48.
200 Chi-Square (X2) 11.220, df = 2, p < 0.004.
201 Chi-Square (X2) 7.709, df= 2, p < 0.021.
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state and federal 'courts2 2-account for these disparities. There are
key differences in the text of the FAA and the RUAA. In the following
sections, I explain how these differences are reflected in specific federal and state court rulings.
1. Arbitrator Misconduct over Nondisclosures of Past and Present
Relationships
The text in section 23 of the RUAA provides broader grounds
than the FAA in section 10 to vacate awards. The first difference
appears in a grammatical change in subsection (a) (2). The FAA states
a general standard, "where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators."' 20 3 The RUAA subdivides these components and
adds more terms for a reviewing court to consider when it says "there
was: (A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (B) corruption by an arbitrator; or (C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration
proceeding."

' 2 04

The RUAA again mentions arbitrator misconduct in subsection
(a) (3) when it declares that an award may be vacated if "an arbitrator
refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for
postponement, [or] refused to consider evidence material to the controversy." 20 5 This mirrors language in section 10 of the FAA. 206 The
202 My results may reflect differences in federal and state judicial systems, or the
decisional tendencies of judges. In the federal system, judges are appointed by the
President, approved by the Senate, and serve with life tenure. In contrast, many state
judges are elected. Therefore, they may be subjected to more political pressure.
Some studies suggest that the two judicial systems administer the same justice. See,
e.g., Michael E. Solimine &James L. Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in Federaland State
Courts:An EmpiricalAnalysisofJudicialParity,10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 251 (1983)
(arguing that empirical examination reveals that state and federal courts behave
about the same in ruling in favor of constitutional claims). Other evidence suggests
that federal and state judges behave differently. See, e.g., Mark C. Miller, A Legislative
Perspective on the Ohio, Massachusetts, and Federal Courts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 248-49
(1995) (arguing that Ohio courts, and especially the Ohio Supreme Court, are seen
as partisan actors in the state's policymaking process). Another analysis concludes
that "the federal judiciary's insulation from majoritarian pressures makes federal
court structurally preferable to state trial court as a forum in which to challenge powerful local interests." Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105,
1120-21 (1977) (arguing that, compared to state trial courts, federal district courts
are more technically competent in resolving legal issues, more able to analyze complex and conflicting lines of authority, and more accomplished in writing opinions).
203 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
204 UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 23(a) (2) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 74 (2005).
205 Id. § 23(a)(3), 7 U.L.A. at 74.
206 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (3) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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fact that arbitrator misconduct appears twice in the RUAA must mean
that this term differs in subsection (2) compared to the repetition of
the standard in subsection (3). Otherwise, the repetition is an empty
surplus.
In comments for the model act, the RUAA drafters did not elaborate on the meaning of arbitrator misconduct in subsection
(a) (2) (C).207 Therefore, its meaning must be inferred by the grammatical change in the new law, as well as surrounding provisions in
the statute. Misconduct cannot mean refusal to postpone a hearing or
refusal to hear pertinent evidence-again, because these grounds are
mentioned in subsection (a) (3).
Likely, subsection (a) (2) (C) refers to a broad new area of arbitrator conduct that is regulated in RUAA section 12. This regulates arbitrator disclosures to the parties by requiring an arbitrator to disclose
"(1) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding; and (2) an existing or past relationship with any of the
parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding,
their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator."' 20 8
Ovitz v. Schulman,20 9 an important decision by the California
Court of Appeals, is an example of how disclosure regulation contributes to the disparity between state and federal court confirmation of
awards. The arbitration involved a wrongful termination claim by
Cathy Schulman, former president of a major film company. 2 10 During the proceedings, the arbitrator accepted another appointment in
a separate arbitration involving the same movie company. 2 11 After the
arbitrator denied Schulman's claims and awarded her former
employer approximately $1.5 million in damages and $1.8 million in
attorney's fees and costs, 212 Schulman invoked the disclosure law as
grounds for vacating the award. 2 13 The appellate court found merit in
her argument and affirmed the order vacating the award. 214
Two points are notable. First, Schulman did not prove or attempt
to show bias or evident partiality. She simply made her case for vaca207 UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 23(a) (2) cmt. A (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 74
(2005).
208 Id. § 12(a)(1)-(2), 7 U.L.A. at 43.
209 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117 (Ct. App. 2005).
210 Id. at 119.
211 Id. at 120.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 136. The court concluded that because the arbitrator failed to comply
with California Standard 12(b), he was precluded from serving as an arbitrator in any
other matter involving the parties or any lawyer for the parties until the Schulman
arbitration was completed. Id. at 127.
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tur on the arbitrator's unwitting noncompliance with the disclosure
law. Second, the FAA is silent on the subject. If Schulman had sued
under this law, her prospects of vacating the award would have been
highly doubtful.
Consider an FAA case in point, Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 2 15 where another arbitrator made an incomplete disclo-

sure that the losing party characterized as evidence of bias. 2 16 The
chair of that arbitration panel was terminated from his job in a prior
and unrelated dispute by a company named W.H. Newbold. 2 17 W.H.
Newbold hired Sandra Bender, the complainant, after Smith Barney
2 18
fired her.

Bender argued that the arbitrator was required to make this disclosure, reasoning that "'the individual who was instrumental in the
decision to employ [her] was the same party who had the distasteful
duty of discharging [the arbitrator], thereby creating an inference of
bias against [her].' '"219 While the arbitrator disclosed his prior
employment with W.H. Newbold, he failed to mention his adverse
experience with this employer, and the fact that he disputed his termination to the point of arbitrating his own claim against W.H. Newbold.2 20 Bender's motion to vacate the award was denied under the

22 1
FAA's evident partiality standard.
The cases show that the RUAA and the FAA vary in their regulation of arbitrator disclosures. Under the FAA, a party seeking to
vacate an award must prove "circumstances 'powerfully suggestive of
bias."' 222 Much less is needed under the RUAA to cause a court to
intervene: either technical noncompliance with a disclosure deadline,
or failure to comply with an amorphous duty that includes even an
"'appearance of bias.'"223

2.

The Award of Attorney's Fees

These cases are significant because representation costs in arbitrations are increasing and arbitrators are now inclined to order this
215 901 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1994).
216 Id. at 866.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 867.
219 Id. at 866 (quoting Brief of Plaintiff at 6-7, Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 901 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1994) (Civ. A. No. 91-5493 (BS))).
220 Id. at 867 n.2.
221 Id. at 867-68.
222

Id. at 867 (quoting Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523

n.30 (3d Cir. 1994)).
223 Id.
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remedy. 224 Nothing in the FAA precludes the award of attorney's fees.
More to the point, federal courts acting under the FAA have con225
firmed awards that order attorney's fees.

This mirrors the fact that courts routinely award attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs. 22 6 Thus, when the Supreme Court announced in

Gilmer that arbitration is simply a substitute forum for courts, 22 7 this
suggested that arbitrators should behave like judges who award these
fees. The FAA is silent on whether an award should be vacated for
providing this remedy. But given the autonomy that Congress con224 Cassedy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 751 So. 2d 143, 145-46
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (approving an arbitrator's award ordering the employer to
pay a fired employee $300,000 in compensatory damages and $160,000 in attorney's
fees). Major arbitration services expressly authorize arbitrators to award attorney's
fees. See JAMS, JAMS Policy on Employment Arbitration: Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, Standard No. 1, at 2 (Feb. 19 2005), http://www.jamsadr.com/
images/PDF/Employment Arbitration_MinStd.pdf ("All remedies that would be
available under the applicable law in a court proceeding, including attorneys fees and
exemplary damages, must remain available in the arbitration. Post-arbitration remedies, if any, must remain available to an employee.").
225 See, e.g.,
DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 460 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). A female employee filed a sex discrimination lawsuit after her employer
ignored complaints that she was being sexually harassed by her boss. A federal judge
denied her access to a trial by ordering arbitration. Id. at 460. DeGaetano added a
claim for attorney's fees. The arbitration panel awarded her $90,355 in damages and
interest to make her whole for loss of one year of pay, but denied her attorney fees.
Id. at 461. She recovered $146,053 in these fees only after she successfully sued in
federal court. See DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 1613(DLC), 1998 WL
661491, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998).
226 See, e.g., Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 845 (2001)
(reporting that a female worker who was subjected to flagrant discrimination was
awarded $107,364 in backpay and benefits, $252,997 in attorney's fees, and $300,000
in compensatory damages); see alsoJones v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1277,
1290 (D. Kan. 2003) (awarding $53,430 in attorney's fees); Parker v. Olympus Health
Care, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1004, 1007 (D. Utah 2003) (awarding $214,417 in
attorney's fees, plus augmentation oc $41,636); Hall v. Lowder Realty Co., 263 F.
Supp. 2d 1352, 1371 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (awarding $128,149 in attorney's fees); Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y., 998 F. Supp. 301, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(awarding $336,778 in attorney's fees and costs); Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 944 F.
Supp. 508, 516-17 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (awarding $89,687 in attorney's fees, less 10%),
rev'd, 135 F.3d 1041 (5th Cir. 1998); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 925 F. Supp. 956, 967
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding $283,107 in attorney's fees).
227 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) ("'[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbital, rather than a judicial,
forum."' (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985))).
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ferred upon arbitrators, courts should reject challenges to awards that
provide for attorney's fees.
Section 21(b) of the RUAA changes this presumption by stating
that "[a]n arbitrator may award reasonable attorney's fees and other
reasonable expenses of arbitration ifsuch an award is authorized by law
in a civil action involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to
22
the arbitrationproceeding."

8

The italicized language shows how the RUAA's qualified grant of
this arbitrator power can actually lead to vacatur. In a recent case
decided under Colorado's RUAA statute, Carson v. PaineWebber,
Inc., 229 an employee was ordered by an arbitrator to reimburse his
employer for damages arising out of his failure to execute trades on
behalf of clients. 23 0 The arbitrator also ordered the employee to pay
PaineWebber's attorney's fees. 23 1 An appeals court ruled, however,
that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under the newly revised arbitration statute. 2 32 The court based its conclusion on section 13-22-212
of Colorado's arbitration law, a provision that authorizes arbitrators to
award attorney's fees only ifthis power appears in the arbitrationagreement.233 Because the agreement said nothing about this arbitrator
23 4
power, the court vacated this remedy.

A similar case arose in Moore v. Omnicare, Inc. 23 5 The company

acquired David Moore's shares in a pharmaceutical supply corporation and named him chief operating officer. 23 6 Moore was terminated
after the new company struggled financially, and he arbitrated numer228 UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 21(b) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 69 (2005) (emphasis added).
229 62 P.3d 996 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
230 Id. at 997.

231
232

Id.
Id. at 1000 (citing COLO. RE.

STAT.

§ 13-22-212 (2001)); see also RUAA and

UMA Legislationfrom Coast to Coast, supra note 142 (listing Colorado as a state that has
adopted the revised arbitration statute).
233 Carson,62 P.3d at 1000. The language is italicized to highlight the fact that the

terms from the RUAA led to vacatur.
234

Id. at 1001. ("[T]he arbitrator exceeded his powers by awarding attorney fees

in the absence of an express agreement between the parties."). The Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act provided: "'Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including
counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration shall be paid as provided in
the award."' Id. at 1000. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-212 (2001)). The language of the statute has since been changed to mirror the language of the Uniform
Arbitration Act. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-221 (2) (2005), with UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 21(b) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 69 (2005).
235 118 P.3d 141 (Idaho 2005).
236 Id. at 144.
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ous claims against Omnicare. 23 7 In a complex series of interim and
final awards, Moore was granted $130,000 in attorney's fees. 238 Omni-

care appealed in the state district court and prevailed in its motion to
2 39
vacate this part of the award.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the vacatur ruling based on a
state arbitration provision 24 0-which is similar to section 21 of the
RUAA, and identical to language in Colorado's RUAA. 241 This law
disallows the award of attorney's fees by an arbitrator unless an agreement expressly authorizes this power. 24 2 As if to underscore the core
difference between the FAA and the RUAA on this point, the Idaho
Supreme Court wrote: "The Idaho UAA and not the FAA applied to
the substantive law of the parties' contract. With respect to the Judgment to vacate the arbitration panel's award of attorney fees on
2 43
Mednat's Earnings Holdback claim, the judgment is affirmed."
3.

The Award of Punitive Damages

Section 21 in the RUAA provides another opportunity to challenge an award where no explicit grounds exist under the FAA. The
model law says that "[a]n arbitrator may award punitive damages or
other exemplary relief if such an award is authorized by law in a civil
action involving the same claim and the evidence produced at the
hearing justifies the award under the legal standards otherwise applicableto
2 44
the claim."
The reasoning behind this provision is evident in another state
arbitration case, Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc. 24 5 A fired securities

broker alleged that his former employer maliciously attempted to
sever his relationship with clients by defaming him. 24 6 The arbitration
237 Id. at 144-46.
238 Id. at 146.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 148-49 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-910 (2004)).
241 Compare IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-910 ("Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses,
not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as
provided in the award."), with CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-22-221(2) (2005) ("An arbitrator's expenses and fees . . . shall be paid as provided in the award.").
242 Moore, 118 P.3d at 148-49.
243 Id. at 152.
244 UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 21(a) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 69 (2005) (emphasis added). Emphasis is added because the law places a condition on this arbitrator
power, thus limiting arbitrator discretion and creating a new ground for review.
245 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 2003).
246 Id. at 267-68.
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was lengthy and expensive. 2 47 The arbitrators awarded the broker,
Sawtelle, $1.87 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in
punitive damages. 2 48 On a cross-petition to vacate or modify the arbitration award, the firm failed to reduce its punitive damages before
249
the first court to hear its challenge.
On appeal, however, a New York court vacated the punitive part
2 50
of the award, and remanded the issue to the original arbitrators.
The appellate justices concluded that "in awarding $25 million in
punitive damages, the [arbitration] panel completely ignored applicable law, an error that provides a separate basis for vacating the
award." 2 5 They also concluded that punitive damages violated the
Supreme Court's ruling on punitive damages in BMW of North America
2 53
v. Gore.252 Also, the award manifestly disregarded the law.

On remand, the arbitrators accepted "voluminous written submissions, held a one-day hearing, and issued a second award." 254 Then,

they reissued the award with only one cosmetic change. 255 Again, they
awarded $25 million in punitive damages. 25 6 When the matter was
reviewed once more, the lower court vacated the punitive portion a
second time because it was disproportionate to the compensatory
damages.

25

7

Concerned that another remand to the same panel would not
change anything, the lower court ordered a third arbitration before a
new panel. 25 This prompted Sawtelle to ask the court to order remittitur for the excessive portion of the punitive award, and spare him
the additional time and expense in re-arbitrating his case. 2 59 The
court conceded that Sawtelle's "suggestion seems to make sense,' 2 60
and that the "history of this arbitration undermines the very purpose
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

268.
269.
276.
273.

252 Id. at 270-71 (citing BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
253 Id. at 274.
254 Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
255 Id. The only change that the panel made was to modify its finding that the
employer "orchestrated a campaign of deception," to the phrase that the company
"orchestrated and conducted a horrible campaign of deception, defamation and persecution of Claimant." Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 859.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 858.
260 Id. at 859.
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of arbitration: to provide a manner of dispute resolution more swift
and economical than litigation in court."'26' Still, the lower court
refused the motion because no statute authorized the court to set a
conditional remittitur of an arbitration award. The court, therefore,
affirmed its earlier order for a new round of arbitration before differ262
ent arbitrators.
A federal court acting under the FAA provides a contrasting
example. The brokerage firm in Acciardo v. Millennium Securities
Corp. 263 forced out its director of compliance after he refused to participate in regulatory frauds. 2 64 His attorney offered proof that the
firm filed defamatory statements to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and thereby limited his employment prospects. 265

Five former employees testified that they had observed

regulatory violations at the firm, and three testified that when they left
the firm their industry termination forms were marked with false and
derogatory statements. 26 6 The arbitrators awarded $100,000 in puni26 7
tive damages and $5000 in compensatory damages.
The firm argued that this 20:1 ratio violated the company's due
process rights. 268

The court disagreed, reasoning that arbitrators

could base their punitive award on testimony that proved that the firm
engaged in repeated and malicious misuse of the NASD's termination
forms. 269 In addition to finding no due process violation in the puni-

tive award, the court considered whether the remedy manifestly disregarded the law. 270

The firm contended that the law requires a

factfinder to determine a defendant's ability to pay as a precondition
for determining the amount of punitive damages. 27' The court concluded that even if the arbitrators ignored the firm's financial standing, their error was "not so obvious or egregious as to require
272
overturning the award."
Sawtelle and Acciardo highlight differences in how state and federal courts review punitive awards. In theory, no difference should
occur if the main rule is that courts strongly defer to arbitrator rul261
262
263

Id.
Id. at 860.
83 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

264
265

Id. at 415.
Id.

266
267
268
269
270
271
272

Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423.
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ings. State courts, however, are more apt to judge the validity of a
punitive award against recent due process guidelines set forth by the
Supreme Court-guidelines that are law. This signifies the growing
importance of RUAA section 21, which allows an arbitrator to award
punitive damages, but only if a court would be authorized by law to
27 3
order the same remedy based on the same evidence.
This is a new condition on this arbitral remedy, thereby limiting
arbitrator discretion and creating a new ground for review. Moreover,
the RUAA adds language authorizing a punitive award only when the
"award is authorized by law in a civil action," and the award meets the
applicable evidentiary standards, 274 thereby inviting a court to review
arbitrator factfinding. This new development conflicts with the
Supreme Court's recent and strongly worded admonition that reviewing courts should almost never disturb an arbitrator's findings of
fact.

27 5

To be clear, the appeals court in Sawtelle did not apply RUAA
section 21. But the decision is highlighted to show that state courts
acting under this provision have more explicit grounds to vacate an
excessive punitive award compared to an FAA court. The federal
court in Acciardo took a much more deferential approach because the
judge realized the FAA severely limited the court's review.
4. Validity of an Agreement to Arbitrate
A striking difference between the FAA and the RUAA is the addition of the RUAA's fifth substantive ground for vacating an award:
"[T]here was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection
under Section 15(c) not later than the beginning of the arbitration
hearing."2 76 The RUAA drafters explained this change was made "to
address the problem of contracts of adhesion in the statute while tak' 2 77
ing into account the limitations caused by federal preemption."
Their comments elaborated: "Because an arbitration agreement effec273 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(a) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 69 (2005).
274 Id.
275 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001). Garvey emphasized that "established law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the
merits of the parties' dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter
how erroneous the arbitrator's decision." Id. Garvey sent a strong message to the
federal judiciary: do not overturn "the arbitrator's decision because [the court] disagree[s] with the arbitrator's factual findings, particularly those with respect to credibility." Id. at 510.
276 UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 23(a) (5) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 74 (2005).
277 Id. § 6 cmt. 7, 7 U.L.A. at 28.
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tively waives a party's right to a jury trial, courts should ensure the
fairness of an agreement to arbitrate, particularly in instances involving statutory rights that provide claimants with important remedies." 278 Moreover, "[c]ourts should determine that an arbitration

process is adequate to protect important rights. Without these safeguards, arbitration loses credibility as an appropriate alternative to
litigation. "279
Scott v. Borg WarnerProtective Services28 0 is a dramatic illustration of
how this fairness concept can lead to vacatur. Consider that the odds
of vacatur are generally low. Also, let us assume that a pro se appellant is at a disadvantage over a company who is represented by lawyers
in a court. The fact that Scott overcame these steep odds demonstrates the potency of the fairness concept in the RUAA.
The case came up for appeal in 2003 after Scott had been compelled to arbitrate 28 ' an employment disability claim and the district
court affirmed the arbitrator's award against him. 28 2 By this time,
Hawaii had adopted the RUAA and its supreme court had ruled
broadly to deny enforcement to compulsory arbitration agreements
that are the "'result of coercive bargaining between parties of unequal
bargaining strength."' 283 Applying this state law, the federal appeals
court vacated the award because the employee was not bound by the
arbitration agreement. 28 4 Using the reasoning behind the RUAA's
fairness concerns, the court noted that Scott was given the arbitration
agreement "to sign on a 'take this or nothing basis' and thus it was the
result of coercive bargaining between parties of unequal bargaining
strength."2 5 The court also noted that the agreement unfairly
2 86
advantaged the employer in its substantive and procedural clauses.
Finding that the arbitration agreement was not valid in the first place,
278

Id.

279

Id.

55 F. App'x 414 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 415.
Scott v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1143 (D. Haw. 2001),
rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Scott v. Borg Warner Protective Servs., 55 F. App'x
414 (9th Cir. 2003).
283 Borg Warner, 55 F. App'x at 416 (quoting Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 921
P.2d 146, 167 (Haw. 1996)).
280
281
282

284
285
286

Id.
Id.
Id. The agreement provided that "only the company has standing to enforce

this agreement to avoid piecemeal litigation." Id. In addition, Scott was required to

submit his claims to binding arbitration within sixty days of Borg Warner's request or
be barred from future recourse. Id. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was "therefore unenforceable under Hawaii law." Id.
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the court ruled that the arbitrator lacked the authority to resolve
287
Scott's claims; therefore, the court vacated the award.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

My research takes an unusually long view of the relationship of
courts and arbitration-from 1697 to 2007. This provides exceptional
perspective to evaluate the finality of arbitration awards. Quantitative
analysis adds an important dimension to traditional research that
infers trends from leading appellate decisions. With a sample of 426
cases, this study is large enough for significance testing. The result is
an objective comparison of federal and state court tendencies to
vacate awards.
Applied together, historical and statistical analysis lead to a reassessment of court review of awards. Since the time of Lord Mansfield,
courts have taken a minimalist approach in reviewing arbitration
awards. A more interventionist pattern is now evident. At first glance
state judges appear to be the culprits. On closer inspection, state laws
that prescribe broader reviewing standards are probably causing this
change. As the RUAA and similar state laws attempt to improve fairness in arbitration, courts perform a larger role in refereeing a process that the FAA intended to insulate from their interference.
There is irony in this development. The FAA created this
dilemma by providing dual jurisdiction in federal or state courts.
Amazingly, the federal law empowers states to legislate entirely different award review procedures compared to its minimalist approach.
The deeper problem is institutional. Are courts or legislatures
best at preserving the autonomy of arbitration? For too long, courts
have been portrayed as jealous competitors to arbitration. The FAA
wrenched control of arbitration from these supposedly untrustworthy
courts. This shift occurred even as Congress ignored evidence that
many common law courts reviewed awards with great deference. Paradoxically, instead of inventing their own standards, Congress adopted
common law standards to review awards, though they had little or no
idea about their origins! 288
This institutional dilemma deepened as the FAA kept courts on a
short leash for nearly seventy years. Judges were in no position to
counteract questionable-even abusive-arbitration practices that
employers began to adopt following the pro-arbitration decision in
Gilmer in 1991. Employers were emboldened to implement arbitration procedures to enhance their advantage over individuals. They
287

Id.

288

See supra Parts IB, II.
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shifted large forum costs to employees, 28 9 designated inconvenient
venues, 290 restricted the remedial powers of arbitrators, 291 shortened
time bars to file claims, 29 2 and selected arbitrators without employee
2 93
input.
Meanwhile, courts blindly accepted the judicial hostility thesis.
As a result, they failed to oversee arbitrations with the pragmatism of
common law courts. My study shows that these courts administered
pro-arbitration doctrines that were flexible enough to allow for equitable principles to prevent miscarriages of justice in arbitration.
A third institution-large, private providers of arbitration services-recently entered the picture in the 1990s by enacting their own
procedural reforms. As Congress prepared to regulate securities
industry employment, the NASD revised its procedures. 29 4 Another
large ADR provider, the American Arbitration Association, heeded
the concerns of the American Bar Association by adopting due process procedures and practices. 295 As more balanced procedures were
289 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003)
("Minimal research will reveal that the potential costs of arbitrating the dispute easily
reach thousands, if not tens of thousands, of dollars, far exceeding the costs that a
plaintiff would incur in court.").
290 See, e.g., Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. Civ. 01-545(JRTFLN), 2002
WL 100391, at *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2002) (finding an arbitration agreement unenforceable where Minnesota employees were required to arbitrate in California), rev'd,
346 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2003).
291 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826-27 (S.D.
Ohio 1999) (upholding a $162,000 punitive damage limit imposed by an arbitration

agreement, although Title VII permits up to $300,000 in punitive damages).
292 See, e.g., Louis v. Geneva Enters., 128 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914, 917 n.2 (E.D. Va.
2000) (holding that a sixty-day filing limit in an arbitration agreement unlawfully conflicted with a three-year statute of limitations for FLSA claims).
293 See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding
that the only possible purpose of the employer's arbitration rules was "to undermine
the neutrality of the proceeding").
294 In December 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission amended NYSE
Rules 347 and 600 "to exclude claims of employment discrimination, including sexual
harassment, in violation of a statute from arbitration unless the parties have agreed to
arbitrate the claim after it has arisen." Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Arbitration Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40858, 64 Fed. Reg. 1051, 1051 (Jan. 7, 1999). This followed an SEC
decision on June 29, 1998, approving a proposed rule change offered by the NASD
that abolished mandatory NASD arbitration of statutory employment discrimination
claims. Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109, 63
Fed. Reg. 35,299, 35,303 (June 29, 1998) (becoming effective on Jan. 1, 1999).
295 Susan J. McGolrick, Revised AAA Arbitration Procedures Reflect Due Process Task
Force Scheme, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 102, at A-1 (May 28, 1996). The American
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utilized, some employers abandoned arbitration in favor of trials. 296
But these reforms did not slow the progress of idealistic drafters of the
RUAA. In the interest of making arbitration fairer, they created a
larger supervisory role for state courts.
We now arrive at the core problem. Federal courts review awards
narrowly under a statutory policy that promotes finality of arbitrator
judgment, while state courts increasingly review awards under a statutory policy that promotes procedural fairness in arbitration. States
that adopt the RUAA or similar laws are sacrificing final and binding
arbitration for fairer arbitrations that are subject to increased court
review. The fairness principles in the RUAA are laudable, but RUAA
drafters seem to have ignored an ancient maxim of fairness-the
29 7
Magna Carta's injunction that justice delayed is justice denied.
RUAA drafters never imagined that so many arbitrations at the state
level would leave the underlying arbitration agreements, which secure
a promise for a final and binding award, in tatters-with an apparent
winner in arbitration deprived of justice.
These recent developments are rooted in the transfer of institutional oversight of arbitration from courts to legislatures. Ultimately,
this means that arbitration is more exposed to lobbying efforts by special interests who want to tailor ADR processes to suit their preferences. This development is pernicious, not only because it fragments
a policy that was meant to be uniform, but also because the legislative
process cannot be trusted as much as the common law to resist "quick
fix" solutions. Legislators cannot be trusted to disregard political
Arbitration Association revised its procedures for mediation and arbitration of
employment disputes to ensure due process for employees. The new rules resulted
from AAA's one-year pilot program in California, which implemented experimental
rules developed by a committee of management and plaintiff attorneys, arbitrators,
and retired judges. Also, the new rules incorporated due process suggestions from
the ABA's Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment. As part of
this reform, AAA constituted a roster of employment arbitrators who must undergo a
national training program that updates substantive and procedural issues. In addition, another leading arbitration service, JAMS/Endispute, adopted similar rules in
January 1995. These due process reforms vested wide-ranging powers of discovery in
arbitrators, provided individuals the right to representation, adopted the same burdens of proof as in courts, and granted arbitrators broad remedial powers, including
authority to order attorney's fees. Moreover, arbitrators must be experienced in
employment law, have no conflicts of interest, disclose all relevant information affecting neutrality, and be mutually acceptable to the parties. Id.
296 Jane Spencer, Waiving Your Right to a Jury Trial: After Years of Requiring Arbitration, Companies Return to the Court System, but with Conditions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2004,
at DI.
297 See MAGNA CARTA cl. 40 (1215) ("To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay
right or justice." (emphasis added)).
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pressure from interest groups such as the insurance industry and the
plaintiffs' bar when they consider specific RUAA amendments.
To illustrate, when Nevada adopted the RUAA, its version of the
law excluded the model statute's limited grant to empower arbitrators
to award punitive damages. 298 The insurance industry lobbied for this
total exclusion, arguing that it gave arbitrators too much power. 29 9 In
Maryland, business groups blocked passage of the RUAA because they
objected to a provision that would allow for class actions in arbitrations. 300 On the liberal side of the political spectrum, consumer
groups and the Attorney General's Consumer Division were concerned that the bill would expand mandatory arbitration clauses in
30 1
consumer contracts.
My data show that the United States has two different justice systems for enforcing arbitration awards-one that is minimalist, rooted
in centuries of common law experience, and also devoid of political
maneuvering, and another that naively promises more fairness in arbitration while subjecting this private process to state-by-state special
deals that are worked out in obscure state legislative committees.
Even if the common law approach had its flaws, its virtue was that a
single misguided decision could not have the same effect as a statute.
Other judges would consider whether a questionable decision was
worthy to be cited as a precedent. There is no incremental check on a
statute.
Against this bleak forecast for arbitration, present conditions are
unsettled. The review that occurs in federal court is among the narrowest in the law, and finality is virtually assured. An award challenger
has a 92% chance of losing in district court, and an 87% chance of
losing again on appeal. Multiplying these odds, the award challenger
has an 80% chance of losing in both rounds.
The same challenger in state court is much more likely to vacate
an award. The 78% chance of losing in district court, multiplied by an
over 70% chance of losing again on appeal, means that the challenger
has a 54.6% chance of losing in both rounds. This is specific evidence
that intrusive state court review denies justice to arbitration winners.
State expansion of reviewing standards poses three additional
problems:
(1) Foremost, this trend has broken the federal policy that favors
arbitration. While the Federal Arbitration Act is nominally in place,
298
299
300
301

See RUAA and UMA Legislationfrom Coast to Coast, supra note 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the reality is that the FAA permits one federal policy and fifty separate
state policies to regulate arbitration. When Congress and the
Supreme Court beat the drum to proclaim that the FAA provides a
national arbitration policy, they are wrong.
(2) Congress could not have intended to create two different
regimes for award enforcement-one very deferential, and the other
more inviting for award challenges. The results imply that the RUAA
will promote forum shopping to vacate awards. Award winners should
run to federal court to confirm their awards, while challengers should
race to state court to greatly improve their odds of vacatur. This poses
a threat to the cost, efficiency, and time-saving advantages of arbitration over court adjudications. Congress could never have intended
this absurdity.
(3) A moral hazard is created when losers at arbitration are
tempted to renege on their initial submission in order to pursue "doover" adjudication. Consider the potential spillover effects for an
already dysfunctional civil justice system. 30 2 When courts vacate
awards, disputes remain unresolved. Ironically, vacatur encourages
court adjudications. Award challenges are inexpensive, summary
judgment proceedings. The more that vacatur occurs, the more it
stimulates award challenges. As courts overturn awards, winners at
arbitration find that they are either too late to file an action in court,
or must go to the back of a long line that has formed at most courts.
In time, high vacatur rates will crash the arbitration system by destroying confidence in the finality of an award. Ironically, this is precisely
what FAA lawmakers wanted to avert.

302

See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial." An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-

ters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.EMPIRICAL

LEGAL STUD.

459, 516 (2004) (explaining

that so few lawsuits result in a trial because "the architecture of the system . . . has
capacity to give full treatment to only a minority of matters entitled to invoke it").

